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ABSTRACT 
 The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program is an 
interagency, multiple-stakeholder organization, which works to enable cooperative 
solutions to endangered species issues on New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande. The 
Program is a product of what some authors describe as a “new age” of environmental 
management. This study focuses on how local stakeholders interact with federal and state 
agencies within the Program to cooperatively invest in institutional changes to solve 
problems with tools of the “new age” environmental management paradigm.  It evaluates 
these tools in the context of pitfalls presented by dynamic interactions and an imbedded 
“rule of law” regulatory system and culture. It finds that disparities in influence between 
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stakeholders who represent common objectives but disagree upon Program trajectories 
can diminish buy-in among the less influential parties. Less influential stakeholders in 
these scenarios may feel greater advantage pursuing litigious alternatives that threaten the 
longevity of the program. Such threats reinforce the “rule of law” status quo which 
enables guaranteed protections to environmental goods or water rights, but falls short of 
realistic solutions to the problems of the Middle Rio Grande.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program 
(“MRGESCP” or “Program”) is an interagency, multiple-stakeholder organization, which 
came about in the early 2000’s to enable cooperative solutions to endangered species 
issues on New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande (MRG) (MRGESCP 2012 Draft ). The 
program has attempted, with some success, to bridge political gaps and seek solutions to 
habitat and flow regime issues present on the MRG. However, it grapples with deeply 
challenging structural issues that manifest in inefficiency, territorial posturing and 
confusion over the scientific realities the Program faces. Program participants are divided 
as to how they expect and desire the future to play out, and they have varying levels of 
confidence regarding its current trajectory. These factors combined threaten the 
capabilities of various players to invest in institutional advances. 
 The Program, which has focused on avoidance of species jeopardy for the Rio 
Grande Silvery Minnow and Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, is currently attempting to 
develop a new trajectory toward species recovery. It is simultaneously contending with 
(1) the pressures of reinitiating the consultation process for a new Biological Opinion 
(BO) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA or Act), (2) a progressively critical 
drought situation and (3) continually decreased funding to support the Program. 
Cooperation and patience are at many times strained, and participants are uncertain as to 
how the program’s future will play out.  
The MRGESCP employs collaborative processes and is developing an adaptive 
management (AM) protocol for its activities. Both are hallmarks of many of the large-
scale river restoration projects currently underway in the U.S. (Freeman 2010). The 
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program’s main catalyst is the ESA, and in employing collaboration and AM, the 
MRGESCP qualifies as part of what some authors call a “new age” environmental 
management paradigm that developed out of 1990’s effort to transform ESA 
implementation (Sax 2001, Doremus 2001).  
This study focuses on the evolution in environmental management techniques 
included in this “new age” and how they may be affected by the challenges of collective 
mobilization of resources and the existing regulatory structure in the context of a specific 
program. Central to developments is the concept of biodiversity and a focus on habitat 
restoration and protection in response to what most scientists agree to be an extinction 
crisis (Sax 2001, Salzman and Thompson 2010). This is reflected in 1990’s policy 
amendments to the ESA and the initiation of multiple large-scale river/ecological 
restoration programs in the same time period (Doremus 2001, Babbit 2005, Gerlak 2008).  
The “new age” is driven from another direction as well. Implementation of the 
ESA is no less a social and political issue (Freeman 2010). The ESA is arguably the most 
powerful environmental statute in the world and with that distinction; it is also one of the 
most controversial (Salzman and Thompson 2010). The ESA provides only minimal 
consideration of cost to economies or industry in its designation of species critical 
habitat. Otherwise it explicitly ignores economic concerns (Ibid.).  Many have viewed its 
neglect of these factors to render its goals impractical and politically unachievable 
(Doremus 2001). The introduction of collaborative processes and adaptive management 
in large-scale restoration projects stems in large part from a need to make the ESA 
flexible and accountable to social, political and economic considerations (Freeman 2010). 
Effectively, these reforms serve to protect the Act itself from political attack in congress, 
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but challenge the confidence of Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations 
(ENGOs) (Ibid.).  
Each of the collaborative river restoration programs is unique and heavily 
influenced by local dynamics. Because of its neglect of economic concerns, the ESA is 
possibly detrimental to the regulated community (Doremus 2006 from Scott et al. 2006). 
Therefore, the success of a given program may hinge heavily on local dynamics. This 
study frames ESA-driven collaborative programs as the product of both regulation and 
the incentives and interests of stakeholders with a specific focus on the regulated 
community’s interaction in partnership with regulators and action agencies and the 
resulting structure of risk and incentive. It investigates what factors mobilize these 
partners to invest in and supply institutions that benefit all partners. This investment is 
termed “Institutional Supply” by Ostrom (1990). Its successful provision is hindered by 
the potential for some partners to take advantage of collectively supplied institutions 
while investing little themselves. The study examines how partners are able to overcome 
these “second-order collective dilemmas” (free-riding) in the provision of institutions that 
allow them to avoid jeopardizing and actually aid in species recovery, while also 
protecting current and future water rights. It uses concepts of institutional change 
developed in Ostrom (1990) and looks at how well the program has been able to (1) 
achieve collaboration, (2) whether the incentives for activity are geared toward mutual 
gains, and (3) achieve protection of species or produce shelter for various parties from 
regulation and liability. It relies significantly on work conducted by Freeman (2010) with 
regard to the specific application of Ostrom’s theories to another large-scale, ESA driven 
river restoration program on the Platte River. Finally it focuses on literature regarding the 
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regulatory system and culture and its affect on collaboration in the MRG. The Program is 
then assessed regarding how well it meets the challenges of mobilizing investment. The 
methods being employed in the Program (i.e. collaboration and adaptive management) 
are evaluated to see whether the factors that are required for successful collaborative 
implementation of ESA compliance are present and whether this situation is the proper 
venue for application of the “new age” management paradigm. This study was conducted 
through the use of observation of group meetings, semi-structured interviews with 
participants and analysis of program documents.  
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2. Study Question and Goal 
 
The overarching research question for this study is: what mobilizes or prevents 
the MRGESCP’s partners’ or potential partners’ investment of time and resources to 
participate in collaborative, adaptive implementation of the Endangered Species Act? 
This study contributes to the understanding of collaborative implementation of the 
Endangered Species Act on three levels.  It provides a case study of a program that has 
not previously been evaluated under Ostrom’s framework of collective mobilization of 
institutional supply. This is of use as a component of a broader study of stakeholder 
dynamics in similar large-scale river restoration activities. Its findings can be generalized 
to evaluate the “new age” methods being employed, as the study demonstrates how local 
dynamics interact with broader policy goals to either reinforce or call into question the 
methods of collaboration and adaptive management. On a practical level, the results of 
this study serve as a critical assessment of the Program, which program partners can use 
to amend their actions or governance framework to achieve a more successful program.  
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3. Background 
 
3.1 History of the MRGESCP 
 
The ecology of the MRG has been dramatically altered by human modification of 
the river and surrounding flood plain (Phillips 2010). Between 36% and 73% of native 
fish species have been completely eliminated from the river system while over twenty 
exotic species have been introduced. Exotic vegetation and fish, climate change and 
progressive growth in water demands will increasingly threaten the native species that 
exist today (newmexiconaturalhistory.org 2012).  
One of the two ESA-listed species, the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow 
(Hybognathus amarus) (minnow) now occupies around 5% of its original range (Ibid). 
The minnow was listed as endangered in 1994 followed by a migratory bird, the 
Southwestern Willow Flycatcher (Empidonax traillii extimus) (flycatcher) in 1995.
1
 
Critical habitat was first designated in 1999 and 2003 for the minnow and revised in 2005 
for the flycatcher (59 FR 36995, July 20, 1994, codified in 50 CFR §17.11, Federal 
Register, Volume 60 #38 1995, 64 FR 36274, July 6, 1999).  
Drought conditions in 1996 saw the entire flow of the river diverted at the San 
Acacia diversion dam (Figure 1). This resulted in a significant minnow kill and the 
initiation of the San Juan-Chama Project (SJCP)
2
 Supplemental Water Operations 
Program by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). The critical habitat designation 
was challenged in court by local conservancy district serving irrigators- the Middle Rio 
Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD). Meanwhile, environmental non-governmental 
                                                          
1
 For complete description of the ESA and its mechanics including Listing, Critical Habitat, “Take”, 
Section 7, Biological Opinions (BO) and others see section 3.2 below. 
2
 For complete description of the San Juan-Chama Project see section 3.3 below. 
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organizations (ENGOs) sued Reclamation and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for 
failing to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or Service) under the 
ESA for their MRG water operations (Kelly 2011). The City of Albuquerque (City)
3
, 
MRGCD and Rio Chama Acequia Association all intervened in litigation as claimants of 
the diversions in question. As a result of this litigation, a court order forced recipients of 
San Juan Chama Project water to lease water for purposes of sustaining the minnow and 
for irrigation (Ibid.). Under an agreed order, additional water was pumped from the low-
flow conveyance channel north of Elephant Butte Reservoir, the City of Albuquerque’s 
artificial minnow refugium was developed, and support for MRGCD efficiency 
operations initiated (Ibid).   
In 2001, congressional appropriations were authorized for a collaborative program 
to begin various projects to help the minnow, and FWS issued a three-year Biological 
Opinion (BO) to cover ongoing actions under the ESA. A second BO was released in 
2003 to cover the Program and its partner’s activities in the MRG for ten years. In 2004, 
Congress passed the “minnow rider” which directed the Secretary of the Interior to 
establish an Executive Committee (EC) and implement a 75/25 federal/ non-federal cost 
sharing provision. It also specified that SJCP water could only be used for species 
purposes if leased by Reclamation from willing sellers, and protected action agencies 
from litigation if compliant with the 2003 BO (H.R. 2754-23§208). In 2009, the EC 
began efforts to transition the collaborative program to a Recovery Implementation 
Program (RIP) in order to enhance the focus of the program on recovery. In 2011 the EC 
agreed to follow an AM protocol for the Program’s activities (MRGESCP 2012 Draft).  
                                                          
3
 The City of Albuquerque’s municipal water supply is now managed by the Albuquerque/Bernalillo 
County Water Utility Authority (ABCWUA or Authority), a separate entity and signatory created since the 
original litigation. 
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Currently, the Program suffers from the cumulative effects of pressures it faces in 
the run up to the expiration of the 2003 BO. Specifically, the timeline for completion of 
the RIP documentation has been overrun and consequently will not initially be included 
in the 2013 BO. Details regarding the development of RIP at issue include: controversy 
regarding structural changes such as third-party management of the RIP, and a lack of 
clarity regarding how the FWS will gauge sufficient progress of regulated partners under 
the RIP. This has spurred a game of “chicken” in which partners, action agencies and the 
FWS all appear to want another party to make the first commitment. At the same time, a 
rift has grown between the two action agencies, the Corps and Reclamation over whether 
to implement a joint consultation with FWS. Cumulatively, the effect has been to overrun 
the deadline for completion of the new BO in early 2013.  This rescheduling has created a 
seven-month opening before completion of the 2013 BO in which the minnow rider’s 
protection against litigation is no longer valid.  
Currently, the program has invoked language in the 2003 BO to extend ESA 
coverage during resolution of the above stated issues. Interviews and observations of EC 
meetings reveal a general mood of frustration and wariness among many partners as the 
above mentioned protection from litigation expires on March 16, 2013. 
3.2 Complexities of Regulated Rivers  
 
Challenges to watershed management include the regulated factors of clean water 
and air, endangered species, irrigated agriculture and land use management at the federal 
and state level. Each western state has similar yet diverse allocation laws for surface 
water and ground water. Each phenomenon is administered by different agencies at 
federal, state and tribal levels (Gillon 2002).  
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3.2.1 The ESA and other relevant regulatory structures 
 
The federal ESA is a key factor in most of the collaborative river governance 
programs in the U.S. (Karkainnen 2002). The ESA is summarized by Benson (2010): 
Section 4 of the ESA requires the FWS or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to 
list threatened or endangered species. Once a species is listed, a number of protections 
immediately fall into place.  It becomes illegal to “take” a listed species, with limited 
exceptions.
4
  The term “take” is broadly defined to include any actions that harm the 
species, including “habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, 
feeding, or sheltering” (50 CFR § 17.3).  Listing also triggers the requirement that the 
appropriate wildlife agency designate critical habitat for the species either concurrently 
with the listing of the species or within one year of listing.  Critical habitat designation 
becomes important in large part because the proposed adverse modification of critical 
habitat triggers the ESA’s consultation requirement.  Under Section 7 of the ESA, all 
federal agencies are required to consult with the appropriate wildlife agency to ensure 
that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or 
result in destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.  The consultation process 
applies to all federal actions, broadly interpreted by the courts to include not only direct 
construction projects but also the granting of licenses and contracts and the promulgation 
of regulations (Sullins 2001).  Once an action agency determines that its proposed 
activity “may affect and is likely to affect” the species, the wildlife agency issues a BO, 
which includes an analysis of whether the proposed action is “likely to jeopardize the 
                                                          
4
 Prohibition Against “Take”;ESA Section 9 (16 U.S. C. § 1540) It is illegal to “take” a listed species 
without a permit under Sections 7 or 10. Seldom enforced against private parties due to burden of proof 
issues—must show “actual injury” to listed species. 
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continued existence of the species or adversely modify designated critical habitat.” (16 
U.S. C. § 1536)   If a jeopardy determination is made, the BO identifies any “reasonable 
and prudent alternatives” (RPAs) that would allow the action agency to move forward 
with the proposed activity.  A BO includes an “Incidental Take Statement,” anticipating 
that some take of species may result from the proposed project.  The Incidental Take 
Statement outlines terms and conditions designed to reduce the impact of the anticipated 
“take” that are binding on the action agency (USFWS 2007). 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) sets about to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of the nation’s waters”, prohibits “Discharge of toxic 
pollutants,” provides for “water quality which provides for the protection and propagation 
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on water.” The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) accomplishes this by setting effluent limits 
based on technology and economics for hundreds of pollutants for categories of 
dischargers with state determined ambient water quality levels for receiving waters 
(Gillon 2002). 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) forces agencies to produce an 
Environmental Impact Statement for any federal action that may impair the environment. 
Counsel on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations call on federal agencies to 
“Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives to the proposed 
actions and devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail including 
the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits…include the 
alternative of no action and include appropriate mitigation measures not already included 
in the proposed action or alternatives.” The environmental consequences of this section 
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of the EIS “forms the scientific and analytic basis” for the comparison of alternatives. 
Once an action is deemed to have a significant impact, mitigation measures must be 
developed where feasible (Ibid.) 
Most western states water allocation systems are based on some version of the 
prior appropriation system. The system at its core allocates rights to appropriators to 
make beneficial use of water diverted from a watercourse. Senior (prior) appropriators 
have the better right and if “relation back” and continuous use can be proven, the date of 
intent to appropriate, or application for permit, stands as the date of appropriation. During 
shortages, junior users are cutoff and all parties’ rights must be exercised continuously to 
avoid forfeiture. However, each state’s water rights will be variously adjudicated or not 
and different systems of delivery and administration will exist depending on how special 
districts interact with state law and federal water management agencies (Tarlock et al 
2009). 
Each major river will have a “Law if the River” that embodies the products of 
decades of litigation and negotiation among the river’s users. Among these are interstate 
compacts, which are agreed between states and enacted by congress (Tarlock et al 2009, 
Gillon 2002). Federal and State laws mentioned already, international treaties and Indian 
water rights are included as well as vestiges of indigenous culture and Spanish and 
Mexican laws and grants (Gillon 2002). 
3.2.2 Agency Overlap and sharing of responsibility 
 
The existence of so many regulatory components in river management means that 
multiple agencies, each responsible for a small portion of the responsibility for river 
governance will interact at all levels of government. At the federal level, Reclamation 
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maintains dams and diversion structures and irrigation works administering water 
delivery for various contracted recipients and individuals with state-permitted water 
rights. It is the nation’s largest wholesaler of water and second largest producer of hydro-
electricity (Susskind et al 2010). The Corps, manages projects, maintains navigation 
channels, and operates and maintains reservoirs and levees to control floods. It also 
manages hydroelectric power generation. FWS and NMFS administer the ESA and the 
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act to protect fish and wildlife not listed under the ESA 
whose survival may be jeopardized by federal actions. The CWA requires EPA to set 
water quality standards for and control discharges into surface waters. State agencies may 
also exist to administer a state’s duties under interstate compacts and municipal and tribal 
governments, and special districts may each have responsibility for management of the 
same water as it travels from purpose to purpose (Gillon 2002). 
3.3 The Middle Rio Grande Management Context 
 
 Specific to the MRG are several factors of importance to specific stakeholders’ 
roles. These include the SJCP, the Rio Grande Compact (Compact), Tribal Trust 
obligations of federal agencies, and Prior and Paramount (P&P) water rights. 
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Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Relevant 
Locations and Activities (MRGESCP, 2012) 
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3.3.1 The San Juan Chama Project 
 
Reclamation offers this description of the SJCP: The San Juan-Chama Project 
consists of a system of diversion structures and tunnels for trans-mountain movement of 
water from the San Juan River Basin to the Rio Grande Basin. Authorized as a 
participating project of the Colorado River Storage Project, the San Juan-Chama Project 
provides an average annual diversion of about 110,000 acre-feet of water from the upper 
tributaries of the San Juan River.  Primary purposes of the San Juan-Chama Project are to 
furnish a water supply to the middle Rio Grande Valley for municipal, domestic, and 
industrial uses.  The project is also authorized to provide supplemental irrigation water 
and incidental recreation and fish and wildlife benefits. Water is supplied for the 
following municipal, domestic, and industrial purposes: city of Albuquerque, 48,200 
acre-feet; city and county of Santa Fe, 5,605 acre-feet; city of Los Alamos, 1,200 acre-
feet; village of Los Lunas, 400 acre-feet; Twining Water and Sanitation District, 15 acre-
feet; city of Espanola, 1,000 acre-feet; village of Taos, 400 acre-feet; town of Belen, 500 
acre-feet; town of Benalillo, 400 acre-feet; and Jicarilla Apaches, 6,500 acre-feet. 
Supplemental water is provided for irrigation of 89,711 acres in the Middle Rio Grande 
Conservancy District, 20,900 acre-feet; and 2,768 acres in the Pojoaque Valley Irrigation 
District, 1,030 acre-feet. An annual allocation of about 5,000 acre-feet is available for the 
Corps of Engineer's Cochiti Reservoir for fish and wildlife and recreation purposes to 
maintain a minimum pool of 1,200 surface acres. There is an allocated but as yet un-
contracted supply of 4,990 acre-feet (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2013). 
3.3.2 The Rio Grande Compact 
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Signed in 1938, with Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas as parties and approved 
by Congress in 1939, the Rio Grande Compact apportions the waters of the Rio Grande 
above Ft. Quitman, Texas, among the three states. It provides for administration by a 
commission consisting of the state engineers of Colorado and New Mexico, a 
commissioner appointed by the Governor of Texas, and a representative of the United 
States. The commission meets annually in March. The Rio Grande Compact establishes 
water delivery obligations and depletion entitlements for Colorado and New Mexico. 
Given the variable climate, it provides for debits and credits to be carried over from year 
to year until extinguished under provisions of the compact.  
Accrued credits or debits are an important element of compact accounting. The 
engineer advisors to the compact commissioners meet prior to the Rio Grande Compact 
Commission to determine scheduled and actual delivery of water under the compact. The 
U.S. Geological Survey acts as Secretary to the compact commission under an annual 
cooperative agreement, prepares monthly and annual reports, and maintains the official 
compact commission files (NMISC 2013). 
In recent years the State of New Mexico has been accumulating credit “surpluses” 
due in part to the construction of more efficient channels into Elephant Butte, but 
primarily the fact that there have not been big water years. This seems counter intuitive 
but is based in proportion of water lost in carriage (carriage losses to infiltration and 
evapo-transpiration) between high versus low water years. New Mexico’s maximum 
allocation is 405 thousand acre-feet (kaf) in the MRG and everything above that has to be 
delivered. A portion of the water gets lost in the system, but New Mexico’s full 
obligation to Texas is still due. Losses are made up for by accruing debits (Interview).  
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New Mexico has to deliver a smaller percentage of flows experienced in smaller 
water years. Carriage losses for this smaller percentage are proportionally small enough 
that it is more likely to over-deliver in low flow years and under-deliver in high flow 
years. In a bigger water year, the carriage losses in the system are proportionally so large 
that New Mexico loses everything and has to subtract its own local inflows and deliver 
them to Texas. Bigger water years create debits in New Mexico’s compact accounting; 
smaller water years create credits (Ibid.). 
The State can also, over time, accumulate surpluses. Article 7 of the Compact also 
commonly applies to low flow years. Article 7 dictates that if there is less than 400 kaf of 
water usable for the Rio Grande Project stored in Elephant Butte and Caballo reservoirs, 
New Mexico is prohibited from storing any water in upstream reservoirs that were 
constructed after 1929. Under those restrictions the snowmelt runoff must be allowed run 
through the system to get to Elephant Butte. An exception to this rule states that, if New 
Mexico has a credit surplus at Elephant Butte, it can relinquish that surplus to 
(hydrologic) Texas (Elephant Butte Irrigation District in New Mexico and El Paso One in 
Texas). New Mexico may then store that equal amount in its upstream reservoirs over 
time as a means of making it available for use in the MRG. New Mexico has been 
distributing its accrued surplus allocation of storage and release rights primarily to the 
MRGCD, to some degree to municipalities, and leasing that water to Reclamation (Ibid.). 
3.3.3 Pueblo water rights and Tribal Trust Obligations  
 
“The (New Mexico) Pueblos' water rights are based upon laws spanning hundreds 
of years and several crowns” (Mann 2007 pp.1). Having “distinguished the Pueblo tribes, 
who lived in concentrated village settlements, from the Navajo and Apache, who were 
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nomadic,” the Spanish “recognized and protected Pueblo land holdings and water rights” 
(Ibid). “In 1848, the United States acquired the New Mexico Territory, and the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed the Pueblos' property rights acquired under the Spanish 
and Mexican governments” (Ibid.). “In 1924, Congress passed the "Pueblo Lands Act"” 
in which “the United States government acknowledged a trust relationship between it and 
the Pueblos” (Ibid.). “Congress protected the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos’ "prior and 
paramount" (P&P) right to the water necessary to irrigate their 8,346 acres of historically 
irrigated land (the Secretary of the Interior later increased this to 8,847 acres) within the 
boundaries of the MRGCD and 15,000 acres (later reduced to 11,074.40) of Pueblo land 
that could be "newly reclaimed" by the Conservancy Project. However, even today the 
full extent of the Six Pueblos' water rights has yet to be determined.” (Ibid.). 
3.3.4 Roles of Signatories to the MRGESCP 
 
 The MRGESCP combines sixteen signatory partner entities in a collaborative body meant 
to facilitate shared responsibility for management of MRG endangered species and various water 
uses. Most entities have both mandatory agency and Program related duties that affect their roles 
within the program. These roles are summarized as follows: 
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Table 1: Roles of Program Signatories 
FWS 
• Only Federal Regulatory Agency Signatory to the MRGESCP 
• Charged with Administration of the ESA and Section 7 Consultation 
    o Develops BO  and makes finding of jeopardy/non-jeopardy 
    o Develops RPA’s in consultation with action agencies 
• Main scientific entity in program 
    o Ascertains species health and effects of agency action 
• Dual role as partner and regulator simultaneously 
    o Facilitates permitting for various Program activities (research/restoration) 
    o Regulates compliance 
    o Final authority on all Program activities 
• Role deviates from classic ESA administration model in that the agency is partnered with agencies, municipalities, the 
quasi-public special district, tribes, and NGOs (APA, potentially Environmental) 
Reclamation 
•  Lead federal action agency in ESA Section 7 Consultations 
• Critical source of funding to MRGESCP 
    o Contributes personnel including Federal Chair Person and staff 
    o Secures grant funds for restoration and Program Functions 
    o Leases water from willing sellers of SJCP water and Compact Credits 
• Provides water in Western U.S. to contracted recipients of federal projects 
    o Water provision role integrally ties its activities to those of other water users 
    o Holds title to MRGCD works including El Vado Dam (MRGCD not a federal project) 
    o Does not hold discretion over MRGCD activities 
    o Operates SJCP which distributes project water to municipalities and agricultural interests. 
Corps 
• Second Federal Action Agency in ESA Consultation 
• 2003 BO focused on Corps dam operations 
    o RPA’s required Corps to participate in habitat restoration under its various other authorities. 
• Corps manages waters of the MRG, Rio Chama, and other tributaries for flood control ("controls floodgates") 
    o Standard operations require impounding of water at Cochiti Dam only when safe channel capacity is exceeded 
    o Safe channel capacity at Albuquerque is 7000 cfs 
• (Cochiti Deviation) Corps may deviate from standard ops to provide water for species management if water is made 
available to do so by another water right holding entity. 
    o Corps has no water rights and no duty to deliver water for irrigation or municipal use. 
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MRGCD 
• Major non-federal actor in MRGESCP 
    o Original litigant in minnow litigation, activities strongly effect species 
    o Has water and other assets 
• Formed in 1923 to administer flood control, drainage and delivery 
    o Enabled by state law 
    o Quasi-public entity can tax residents of benefitted area 
    o Not subject to NEPA compliance as are federal agencies 
    o Consolidated original MRG diversion points to four which increased efficiency while making assessment payer’s 
dependent on system. 
• MRGCD provides water for various Program needs and participates in various work groups 
    o Water rights are held by Assessment Payers 
    o MRGCD receives some SJCP water which it can lease  
ABCWUA 
• The Authority is another important stakeholder in the MRGESCP• It is the largest provider of municipal water in the 
state    o It serves Bernalillo County and the City of Albuquerque   o It is the largest user of SJCP water and leases a 
portion of that water to Reclamation for Program purposes• The Authority’s role in the program is cooperative, 
supplying or timing water releases with species needs according to FWS.• The Authority has its own ESA coverage 
under the SJCP BO. 
ISC 
• (New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission) is another important stakeholder in the Program 
    o ISC is responsible for New Mexico’s obligations under the Rio Grande Compact. 
    o Were one of the Interveners in the original minnow litigation 
• ISC has ability to obtain funds from the state legislature and has ongoing working relationship with Reclamation in 
maintenance of pilot channel into Elephant Butte Reservoir 
• As a program partner the ISC has created habitat and artificial refugia for the silvery minnow and worked with 
MRGCD to improve efficiency. 
• It serves as a prodding influence on Reclamation to increase productivity. 
APA 
• (Assessment Payers Association of the MRGCD) An organization that represents (approx. 600) assessment paying 
irrigators and residents of the benefitted area of the MRGCD 
    o Formed in the 1970’s as a watchdog organization over the MRGCD in attempt to constrain  rate increases proposed 
by the district 
    o Irrigators’ livelihoods are directly threatened by limitations the ESA may impose on their water use. 
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Pueblos 
• Four MRG Pueblos are signatory to the MRGESCP 
    o Pueblos hold the most senior water rights in the system (See Prior and Paramount water rights (P&P) description in 
body of text) 
    o Pueblos role in the Program has been representative of Tribal interests and substantive in the way of habitat 
restoration 
• P&P water rights are guaranteed safe from Compact necessities and Tribes retain the right to future development of 
those rights 
    o 2003 BO acknowledges that shortages may occur in the future due to rights of development 
   o FWS believes that nothing in the 2003 BO impairs use of Tribal waters but admits of possibility of infringement on 
Tribal Trust duties of action agencies 
    o 2003 BO also notes that Tribes do not concede that the ESA applies to their actions 
City  
• Has representative and substantive roles in the MRGESCP 
    o The City represents nearly 600,000 constituents 
    o It manages 2,500 acres of open space in the Rio Grande Bosque 
    o It originally represented Albuquerque’s water use before the formation of the ABCWUA 
    o The City’s activities have a minimal need for ESA coverage 
• The City receives Program funding to participate in habitat restoration and run the Bio-Park rearing facility (minnow 
hatchery) that contributes to the Program’s population augmentation program. 
Environmental 
NGOs 
•Have played a crucial role in the development of the MRGESCP though they are not currently signatories to the 
Program     
    o As important members of the early stages of the collaborative process they were involved in drafting long term 
solutions to species problems. 
• Litigation brought by these NGOs forced federal actions, started the consultation process and eventually prompted 
congress to establish the official collaborative program. 
• NGOs left the collaborative table as the Program evolved into a more “hardened, federal-like bureaucratic” structure. 
Calculations of NGO effectiveness, given limited resources, in the “biased” collaborative forum caused NGOs to 
believe that their goals were not practically attainable from within the Program. 
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4. Literature Review 
 
 This study depends upon the concept of institutional supply and its provision 
developed in Ostrom (1990). Institutional supply is a component of collective action that 
refers to provision of and investment in institutions for governance used in evaluating the 
management of common pool resources (CPRs) or resources shared as a commons 
among multiple dependent parties. Many of the principles involved in evaluating 
management of CPRs are applicable to collaborative processes being implemented in 
modern “new age” river restoration programs (Freeman 2010). The relevance of 
application of these principles is strongly influenced by the structure of the program and 
how it fits with the regulatory system in place. In the case of water resources and 
endangered species, applying collective action and the CPR lens is complicated because, 
while a public resource, water in the Western United States is managed under a well-
developed system of private usufructuary rights protected under state law. Demands of 
the federal ESA and agency mandates further confine options developed in a 
collaborative forum. Complicated as application of this lens is, Ostrom’s questions for 
evaluating institutional supply investment do attend directly to existence of peripheral 
regulatory structures (Ostrom 1990). One question here may be to what extent the 
regulatory system is peripheral to the resource management taking place.  
While emphasized in the modern management paradigm, collaboration can be 
hindered or advanced by both the regulatory system and the social-political situations of 
those involved. This literature review will dissect these various factors beginning with the 
theoretical and political reasons for shifting from a strict command-and-control 
regulatory model to collaborative processes and adaptive management. Institutional 
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supply and stakeholder investment mobilization will then be discussed followed by a 
study of the interaction between collaborative processes and the regulatory system and 
culture.  
4.1 The “New Age” of Environmental Management 
 
The combination of social and economic concerns and the impending realities of 
an uncertain biological and climatic future have lead to an academic dialogue concerning 
how to protect bio-diversity, increase social and ecological resilience and increase the 
ability of social/ecological systems to adapt to disturbance or systemic change. These 
must all be integrated into policy and paradigm if effective management will be possible 
(Chapin et al 2009, Chap.1). 
In broad perspective, the reasoning behind this dialogue is threefold. Biodiversity 
is in crisis and thus the building blocks of human society are in jeopardy (Sax 2001). The 
concept of stationarity
5
, on which water management planning is based, is nullified by 
climate change and with that, our perceptions of adaptive capacity are in need of re-
consideration (Milly et al. 2008, Craig 2009). Finally, intra-disciplinary foci in social 
sciences and ecology don’t adequately intersect human activities within ecology and thus 
limit development of effective management solutions to the intensive environmental 
degradation currently taking place (Liu et. Al 2007, Ostrom 2009). 
These factors of extinction, adaptive capacity and human/ecological relationship 
are broadly attended by the concept of resilience based stewardship which enables 
managers [and planners] “to respond to and shape change in social-ecological systems 
                                                          
5
 The concept that future probabilities of flood and drought cycles can be derived from the instrument 
record (Milly et al. 2008). 
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(SES) in order to sustain the supply and opportunities for use of ecosystem services by 
society” (Chapin et al. 2009 pp.29).  
To take the three issues above individually, the emerging inability of planners and 
engineers to predict future conditions based on probabilities derived from instrument 
records (stationarity) is mitigated by increasing and enabling a SES’s ability to adapt to 
various system disturbances or systemic changes. The concept of adaptive management 
(AM) arises from this perspective. AM is a multi-step, iterative process for conducting 
scientific study of management actions by the implementation and rigorous monitoring of 
hypothetically developed management action scenarios (Williams, Szaro and Shapiro 
2009, Smith 2011). The goal is to be flexible in management when new information is 
acquired or systems change. AM is a hallmark of many large-scale river restoration 
programs including, tentatively the MRGESCP.  
It is also advocated that restoration and preservation be re-conceptualized to 
advance the idea that baseline conditions are and have always been dynamic (Craig 
2009). Restoration should be a function of relieving human constraints to allow systems 
to develop their own balance based on current conditions (C.A. Frissell and S.C. Ralph 
from Naiman and Bilby 1998). 
The factors of biodiversity loss and the coupling of human systems with 
ecological systems are interdependent within this study’s concern with the ESA. Social 
and ecological sciences have tended to focus on intra-disciplinary subject matter to the 
extent that human systems and ecological systems are inadvertently rendered 
conceptually distinct (Liu et Al 2007). Where this distinction has influenced policy, the 
substantive result is insufficient for effective conservation. The “enclave” theory: that 
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conservation goals can be achieved by the separation of resources to be preserved and 
resources to be harnessed for economic gain has failed in achieving meaningful 
biodiversity protection because biodiversity must be protected where it is found. This is 
often on or in economically viable resources (Sax 2001). The ESA as written fails to 
account for social and economic considerations when enforcing protections for 
endangered species and has thus sparked controversies that can delay and potentially 
harm endangered species further (Echeverria 2001).  
A modern means of attending to the reconciliation of human economic and social 
systems with the needs of biodiversity is through the implementation of collaborative 
processes (Freeman 2010). Bringing the representatives of all the various interests 
(including those of species) to one table to develop comprehensive, politically legitimate, 
and ecologically viable solutions is problem solving that in theory better represents the 
true impact of human systems on ecological systems and vice versa (Freeman 2010, 
Burger 2011). Collaboration and stakeholder engagement increases effectiveness of the 
negotiated result, develops institutions that bridge public and private interests as well as 
jurisdictional boundaries, and brings parties not formerly involved in ecological 
management into a stewardship role (Burger 2011, Ostrom 1990, Gerlak 2008, Freeman 
2010). Partners in collaboration are able to engage in a broader role than previously 
occupied and engage in a process of relationship building and group learning that 
increases the group’s ability to effectively manage the resource in question (Pahl-Wostl 
2007). 
Other equally important motivations for the same “new age” management 
activities in ESA implementation address what the Clinton Department of the Interior 
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perceived as the politically unachievable goals of the ESA as written (Doremus 2001). 
Attacks on the ESA in congress and focused resistance from the regulated community 
prompted Clinton’s Secretary of Interior to envision collaborative methods as a way of 
making the ESA more flexible (Echeverria 2001). This has allowed consideration of 
important economic factors. However, problems with the model exist. Many 
environmental constituencies have been critical of what they view as shifting emphasis 
too heavily toward resource appropriators’ interests in scenarios where it seems obvious 
that species are paying the higher price, that of likely extinction (Ibid). The true danger of 
ESA repeal in congress or political risk that arises out of strict ESA enforcement is 
potentially over-emphasized by implementing agencies that are predisposed to succumb 
to focused political pressure (Doremus 2001). Collaboration and adaptive management 
(as alternative to hard decisions) have been used effectively to delay substantive action 
toward species recovery (Freeman 2010). The negotiated nature of collaborative 
programs and lack of standardization and unclear legal requirements for adaptive 
management have been seen to promote sluggish if not ineffective conservation activity 
(Echeverria 2001, Nie and Schultz 2011, Ruhl and Fischman 2010). 
4.2 Mobilization of Partner Investment in Institutional Supply 
 
Parties in a collaborative process are faced with numerous obstacles including the 
potential that all parties may benefit by the process though not all may fairly contribute 
(Ostrom 1990). The concept of institutional supply and Ostrom’s questions for evaluating 
a given organization’s potentials are employed to better understand the dynamics of the 
MRGESCP. 
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The ESA creates a crisis for the status quo operation of resource appropriators 
whose activities or reliance on federal agency activities, jeopardize endangered species 
(Freeman 2010). As the impetus for collaborative solutions to this crisis, ESA compliance 
creates a superordinate goal for the parties involved. A superordinate goal is a goal, 
shared by parties who may otherwise be adversaries but are allied because it can only be 
achieved by the collective efforts of the parties and because without its achievement, all 
parties would suffer (Sherif 1958 from Poitras et al. 2003).  Because however, the 
immediacy of the threat that the ESA imposes is diffused by the collaborative process, it 
is possible for participants to engage in a manner that delays or stifles action. This can be 
beneficial to the necessary process of coalition building if all parties will be burdened by 
eventual failure of collaboration to the point that solutions are forced in the collaborative 
forum. If, however, one or more of the parties is not sufficiently burdened by the 
potential failure of collaboration and has sufficient time and financial resources to wait 
out the collaborative process, then the process is jeopardized (Freeman 2010). If parties 
are sufficiently compelled to participate in the process, they will do so with varying 
levels of investment based on their interests, incentives or capabilities.  
The development of collaborative institutions is functionally the development of 
new public goods that benefit all parties to the collaboration regardless of their particular 
contribution. For this reason, the same potential for “free riding” exists with regard to the 
collaboratively developed institution as exists with the actual resource commons the 
institution was developed to administer. This is known as a second-order collective 
dilemma (Bates 1988, p 395 from Ostrom 1990). The ability of stakeholders to address 
this dilemma is greatly influenced by the variables specific to their issue and organization 
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(Ostrom 1990). Issues are numerous and these questions are used in the discussion to 
evaluate the MRGESCP.  
 How many participants were involved?  
 What was their internal group structure?  
 Who initiated action?  
 Who paid the costs of entrepreneurial activities?  
 What kind of information did participants have about their situations?  
 What were the risks and exposures of various participants?  
 What broader institutions did participants use in establishing new rules? 
Answering these questions allows analysis of obstacles, both internal and external 
and discount rates associated with individual stakeholders’ position. Discount rate was a 
relevant factor in relationships within the MRGESCP. Three factors of discount rate are 
applicable. (1) Humans commonly emphasize potential losses over potential gains and (2) 
immediate results (especially costs over gains) over extended results. This may influence 
the level to which individuals discount certain potential benefits to collaboration. (3) 
Individuals with direct and exclusive dependence on a CPR or collaborative institution, 
especially those subject to norms and customs of a resource dependent community will 
place higher value on its management (Ibid.). This last element is the one most applicable 
to the Program and is used to analyze statements in Chapter 6.5. 
An incremental approach to institutional change is necessary (Ibid.). 
Conceptualizing the “origins” of new institutions in a context of “changes” to old 
institutions allows partners the perception of lower cost for provision of institutions. For 
instance, if partners working within an existing framework can loosen constraints to 
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make small alterations that more effectively combat the problems they face, they may be 
able to achieve a small collaborative success. They can then increasingly invest over time 
as they can test and benefit from aspects of incremental reforms. This may relieve the 
expectation of the high cost of completely scrapping or reforming an existing institution 
that may seem a more secure path that something totally new (Ibid.). Small, good faith 
investments can succeed in establishing grounds for future trust and cooperation even in 
light of game and other theories that predict incentive to develop wholly on the prospect 
of prolonged engagement, coercion, or sanction. This is because they are a form of 
communication, a soft behavior that enables reciprocity among players (Ostrom 1990, 
Axelrod 1984, Bates 1988). It is more likely that this mode of investment will result in 
long-term benefit for all parties proceeding in this fashion. Stronger relationships will be 
formed and potential for social learning and substantive advances in management 
effectiveness will be more likely to develop (Fisher and Brown 1988).   
In negotiations, being able to invent options for mutual gains can allow either side 
in a contentious arrangement to see more latitude for improving their situation beyond 
just the options that initially or traditionally occur to the parties involved (Fisher and Ury 
1981). It is advantageous for parties to “expand the pie” and realize the creation of an 
other-than-zero sum game. The operation of expanding the pie is dynamic and influenced 
heavily by those involved and their ability to make a process of the operation. 
Prematurely critical tendencies among parties can diminish the diversity of potential 
options. The conception that a single answer to a given problem or set of problems exists 
also limits the creativity allowed in envisioning a more progressive and mutually gainful 
set of options. In addition it is common for members of a party to assume that they are 
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negotiating a fixed sum and thus preclude any creative expansion of options available. 
Finally, the tendency exists for parties to remain adversarial in the envisioning of options 
for a more holistically gainful program. In this sense, individuals may create barriers to 
effective incentive building by assuming that they have no responsibility for 
understanding the needs of the other side and thus short-change themselves and the 
process as a whole when it comes to securing cooperative agreement by process of 
incentive building (Ibid.).  
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Figure 2: Incentive Building 
Negotiation 
A group’s ability to undertake the 
incentive-options building process 
can be evaluated graphically by 
comparing dynamics to a circle 
chart that illustrates what Fisher 
and Ury view as the necessary 4 
modes of thinking to develop a 
sufficiently diverse array of 
options.(Adapted from Fisher and 
Ury 1981) 
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The quality of collaboration can thus benefit from (1) a group’s ability to make an 
intentional process of the operation by separating inventing from actual decision-making 
regarding options, (2) assuming that “room” must be developed in the number of options 
available for negotiation and (3) realizing that the end product likely contains more 
options than parties came to the table believing existed. Finally, if all sides of a 
negotiation are able to place themselves in each other’s shoes, the conception that each 
party’s self-interest is best served by taking responsibility for a properly negotiated 
agreement can focus incentive building. This contrasts with a situation where parties 
adhere to the status quo and expect the other side to solve its own problems (Ibid.).  
In the development of collaborative processes, it is likely that most parties will 
perceive some benefit to participating in consensus building. This can be enough to 
motivate participation or can be a step in pulling parties to the table when a lack of trust 
or history of confrontation is present. Poitras et al. (2003) argue that the “appeal of 
collaboration” was an intermediate variable between interactions in which collaboration 
seemed impossible for reasons of mistrust and interactions that were more straight-
forward. They identify that mistrust can create a “reactive devaluation” of the benefits of 
collaboration and that simultaneously benefits can be used to incentivize the process of 
conflict analysis that can lead to collaboration. In this model the benefits of collaboration 
are related to the concept of the superordinate goal (Poitras et al. 2003). 
 
Because the specific scenarios of focus in this study are driven by the potential for 
exogenous sanction, development of cooperative relationships will depend on the length 
of time partners collaborate. Freeman (2010) points to necessary periods of “regulatory 
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cruising”, or “stretching” the regulatory system to delay investment, as necessary to 
coalition building within various scales in the collaborative venture. He finds that mid-
level organizations, not directly subject to state or federal control and not directly 
influenced by individual interests, are vehicles to systems of exchange that enable the 
buy-in of constituencies that will benefit from not collaborating and would not be 
burdened by the failure of collaboration. His contention is that the command and control 
administration of the ESA could not achieve this. In the end it is the ability to manage the 
crisis imposed by the ESA that results in functional collaboration. “Cruising” is limited 
when financial resources and time are limited and when sufficient hardship is inevitable 
if collaboration fails. Thus limiting factors in addition to sufficient time for coalition 
building while all parties are under the threat of sanction enables crisis management and 
eventually, investment (Freeman 2010). 
4.3 Collaboration and Regulation: The Problems of Law, Regulatory Culture and 
History 
 
The above description focuses on the dynamics of stakeholders in collaboration to 
meet satisfactory resolutions to conflict through collective action to alter governance 
institutions. It does not touch upon the complex backdrop of regulatory structure, culture 
and history that influences collaborative river governance institutions. The state of the 
modern move toward the use of collaboration in ecosystem governance is precariously 
balanced.  Serious questions exist as to the complexity and legality of collaboration. It is 
unclear whether the tradition and culture of rule based law can or should make way for 
collaboration and uncertain how much the culture produced by the history of water law 
serves to hinder it. 
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Issues of scale and regulatory or scientific capacity in ecosystems and their 
governance agencies seem to require that governance bodies be designed in ways that test 
the limits of regulation (Karkainnen 2002). Ecosystem and similarly, watershed 
boundaries seldom abide political boundaries and are thus subject to multi-scalar, multi-
jurisdictional management (Karkainnen 2002, Gillon 2002). Knowledge and ability to 
gather information about various system functions, ability to access funding sources and 
operational abilities will vary greatly from the scale of landowner, to local government, 
to state and federal levels. Hybrid institutions, “which involve horizontal coordination 
among multiple and (at least nominally equal) ‘sister’ governments” and vertical 
coordination across multiple tiers of government from local to federal can integrate 
capabilities regarding information resolution, funding sources, knowledge and skills to 
successfully manage complex multi-jurisdictional systems (Karkainnen 2002 pp.13). 
“The collaborative ecosystem governance model explicitly recognizes the need for 
integrated, holistic management of ecosystems as systems, and grapples with questions of 
scale and complexity in ecosystem management, emphasizing locally or regionally 
tailored solutions within broader structures of coordination and public accountability” 
(Karkainnen 2002 pp. 3). 
 But prudence, fairness and sheer complexity simultaneously caution heavily 
against abandoning strict rule of law regulation for the ambiguity of the collaborative 
forum (Sousa & McGrory Klyza 2007). As outlined in Chapter 3, challenges to 
watershed management include clean water and air, endangered species, irrigated 
agriculture and land use management at the federal and state level. Each western state has 
similar yet diverse allocation laws for surface water, ground water, and management of 
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wildlife. Each phenomenon is administered by different agencies at federal, state and 
tribal levels (Gillon 2002). Sharing of power in collaboration is complex and not easy to 
accomplish (Karkainnen 2002). 
This complex regulatory patchwork historically attempted to apply highly 
prescriptive remedies in a command and control fashion to the problems of complex and 
largely unique ecosystem circumstances at all scales as if scale were irrelevant 
(Karkainnen 2008). The resulting practical failures have led some to believe that 
alteration to this regulatory system is inevitable. Karkainnen (2008) invokes what Sable 
and Simon referred to in public law as the use of “destabilization rights.” Destabilization 
in the public law context refers to the courts’ use of constitutional or statutory violation to 
“pull the plug on” or destabilize an offending institution while remanding its solution to 
the state to resolve, often in collaboration with the original plaintiffs, while retaining 
jurisdiction for future adjustments. In this way, courts have taken lessons from the civil 
rights era in which forced structural prescriptions developed by judges fell short of 
suitable remedies for a given problem. While a solution is then mandated, the designers 
of the solution are those with expertise to solve the problem. Transferred to 
environmental management, the implication is that the current command and control 
regulatory institution is ossified and ineffective. Karkainnen broadens the use of the 
model to include “destabilization events” in ecosystem governance such as citizen suits 
brought under the ESA or “anthropo-natural” crises such as climate change induced 
droughts that might force more creative solutions than those available under the “rule of 
law” model. 
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Collaborative attempts at resolving the mismatch between the substantive 
problem and the prescriptive solution face the dilemma of how to produce accountability 
without a rigid and formulaic set of rules. Some view them to be the “ultimate policy 
without law—the making of an entirely new approach to regulation and natural resources 
policy without statutory guidance” (Sousa & McGrory Klyzer 2007 pp.3). The dilemma 
exists in that despite the apparent devaluation of the law, the solutions law has provided 
and scope of the regulatory structure are insufficient. For instance, in the proceedings of 
regulatory negotiations (reg-negs), where the regulatory structure is negotiated between 
the regulator and regulated stakeholders, the negotiating committee is authorized only a 
specific scope of authority from which to attend the deliberation. However, “only in the 
process of deliberation is the appropriate scope of a problem likely to emerge…the 
moment when scope issues arise in negotiations is likely also to be the moment the key 
difficulty with the statute, existing regulation or initial conception of the problem 
becomes clear” (Freeman 1997 pp. 25). Without re-conceiving the committee’s 
negotiating authority, or in the broader sense of environmental law, a statute’s authority, 
a proper solution may not be found. Often, this reduces the scope of available reforms, 
especially in that most bargaining taking place in these scenarios is viewed in terms of 
potential issues to be traded or compromised. This creation of a zero-sum approach 
reduces the options for problem solving and makes full disclosure dangerous to parties 
involved (Ibid.).  
However frustrating this can be to the process of solving problems best suited to 
collaborative solutions, the constraints that exist do so for good reason. Environmental 
laws of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s were constructed in a rigid, prescriptive manner 
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in response to “interest group liberalism” that evolved out of the New Deal Era. Interest 
representation functionally contributed to prevalence of industry capture of regulatory 
policy “erasing the distinction between public authority and private interests allowing 
private interests to use public power to achieve their own purposes” (Lowi from Sousa & 
McGrory Klyzer 2007 pp.3).  
Because of its similarity to interest group liberalism, environmental organizations 
strongly oppose collaborative processes in many scenarios where there is likelihood that 
they may weaken existing regulation in favor of industrial interests who are often 
perceived as approaching the collaborative process with a sense of entitlement (Freeman 
1997). Environmental organizations repeatedly feel that the interests at the table are 
strongly weighted in favor of parochial economic interests in processes that involve 
agencies “horse trading” with regulated partners while skirting formal evaluation 
processes (Echeverria 2001). 
The decades of “rule based litigation” that came out of 1970’s environmental law 
produced a rule-based and rule-bound regulatory model (Karkainnen 2002(2)). “It seeks 
to solve environmental problems (and just as importantly, to retain a critical disciplining 
role for public interest lawyers) by imposing and enforcing, in a top down fashion, tough 
binding rules aimed principally at the largest and most visible categories of corporate 
targets and secondarily, federal agencies” (Karkainnen 2002(2)pp.2). The culture of 
entrepreneurial litigators who helped shape this model are integral in retaining it. Despite 
the potential that it hinders more comprehensive solutions to real world problems, the 
ENGOs whose ranks are comprised of many of these same litigators are chronically 
deficient in resources and facing industrial interests with greater incentive to collaborate 
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and comparatively limitless resources. They remain far more committed to retaining the 
“rule of law” model (Karkainnen 2002(2), Freeman 1987).  
Finally, a similarly embedded friction in the legacy of western water law exists 
between state and federal governments and the heterogeneous water appropriators they 
serve. The problem is historical and summarized by Getches (2001): when western water 
resources were public domain, the federal government had no resources to develop or 
enforce their use. Settlers were encouraged to take and use water they found there for 
mining, agriculture and domestic uses. National policy favored development and water 
was an instrument of that policy. If settlers in new states and territories could avoid or 
resolve water conflicts themselves, the federal government was pleased to defer. The 
Supreme Court ultimately held it was the states prerogative to allocate water on public 
lands by any system they chose. Western states relied on decisions recognizing their 
freedom to choose an allocation system to apply within their boundaries to support an 
“expectation of exclusive and perpetual state control over water resources” (DuMars and 
Tarlock 1989 from Getches 2001). The seminal United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation 
Company however, made clear that state-authorized water use must not interfere with 
federal rights to protect flow of the stream and can be superseded by the exercise of 
federal powers over commerce and public lands. “Almost every iteration of the policy of 
deference was accompanied by citations to Rio Grande, which subordinated state control 
to federal supremacy” (Getches 2001 pp.3). Many federal policies seem to give priority 
to state supremacy, but all retain federal control. 
 Internal friction within states characterized the water development era. Although 
publicly claiming state authority over water resources, development of public works was 
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attractive for politicians who could deliver tangible results to their constituents. “The 
primary water policy objective of western politicians in the twentieth century was aimed 
at capturing federal assistance for water projects” (Getches 2001 pp.5). Competition for 
these funds and politics of developing projects created incentive to subordinate state 
water rights and conform state policies to comply with federal goals in order to 
participate in federal dam building. At the end of the water development era states were 
left outraged by combination of constraints imposed by 1970’s era environmental laws 
and the abrupt collapse of federal water project policies in response to public 
environmental sentiment and economic constraints. They felt their control of the future 
had been undermined (Ibid.) 
The tension between water appropriators and federal government in control of 
water rights is epitomized by litigation concerning Section 402.03 of the ESA’s 
implementing regulations which states that only discretionary agency actions on the part 
of action agencies trigger Section 7 consultation (Drake 2001). The regulation itself has a 
convoluted and controversial history (Hasselman 2006). Nonetheless, in the 2007 
decision National Home Builders Association verses Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme 
Court held that if an agency’s authorizing statute mandates that the agency “shall” 
perform certain actions that would normally trigger Section 7, Section 7 does not apply 
(Hasselman 2007). Seen initially as a victory for water users, it is argued that the decision 
may have limited the scope of the regulation by specifying its qualification in such 
narrow terms as mandatory (“shall”) and specifically statutory (Ibid.). Here, arguments 
may be generated for easier findings of agency discretion and may limit the power of 
  
 
39 
regulations or contracts in protecting water users from re-allocation of water for 
endangered species uses (Hasselman 2007, Benson 2011). 
While the complexity of ecosystem and watershed management seem to require 
some sort of comprehensive collaborative approach to governance, this requirement is 
met with a dilemma regarding the propriety of the “rule of law” regulatory system 
(Karkainnen 2002, Sousa & McGrory Klyza 2007). The historical necessities of the “rule 
of law” system and supporting culture of public interest litigators buttress a distrust 
among environmentalists that serves to hinder investment of these parties in the 
collaborative forum. The historical battle for states to assert control over water resources 
against federal encroachment has developed a culture of resistance that, when pitted in 
adversarial zero-sum negotiations, increases the limitations already threatening creative, 
outside the box solutions (Getches 2001, Karkainnen 2002(2)). Environmental advocates 
as well as resource appropriators have ample legal justification to retreat to what may 
seem safer adversarial positions, yet the prescriptive legal solutions rarely satisfy 
disputants real needs (Karkainnen 2002(2)).  
It is relevant to point out some important factors about both the Federal regulation 
and state allocation systems. There are some that view the system of western water 
allocation as “steeped in archaic concepts fashioned to address situations no longer 
relevant” (Cosens 2003 pp.1). Others see it as fair and sustaining to a culture and 
economy that has helped the west to thrive (Willardson 2011).  Most importantly, water 
development is likely the single most significant threat to species (Loso et al 1995 from 
Getches 2001). Because of federal regulations, it is also a threat to human water use 
itself. Specifically regarding the ESA and western water law, both regulatory frameworks 
  
 
40 
provide nearly absolute protection for one interest, neither seeks to balance economic and 
environmental interests, both protect the status quo better than they provide for the future 
and both are already more restrictive on paper than in practice (Benson 2004). While 
collaboration is riddled with difficulty, it is currently tested as a third option, stretching 
the limits of regulation and comfort, and currently serves as the best concept for resolving 
the impasse between environmental and allocation regulatory systems. (Adler 2008, 
Karkainnen 2002(2), Sousa & McGrory Klyza 2007) 
  
  
 
41 
5. Research Design and Methodology 
 
 To understand what factors become mobilizing incentives for investment in 
collaborative ESA implementation on the MRG, it was necessary to understand the 
interests, relationships and pressures of the various partners. Interests illuminated the 
level to which a partner finds itself threatened by the ESA or possible compromise with 
the federal government or other partners (Doremus 2006 from Scott et al. 2006). 
Relationships attest to a level of trust present within the program or how trust and 
coalition building have been fostered (Bates 1988, Freeman 2010). The term 
“relationship” can also describe structural elements such as political or some other 
advantage, need for coverage and resources available. In combination with interests and 
relationships, pressures perceived by the various partners can show potential for “crisis” 
management, time limits on “cruising” and necessity of investment (Freeman 2010, 
Ostrom 1990).  
 Data regarding interests was primarily gathered though a series of semi-structured 
interviews. This was aided by observation of Program meetings and document analysis. 
Understanding of partner relationships was dominantly gathered within the interview 
process as well, but was also effectively supplemented by observation of group dynamics 
in meetings. Pressures were illuminated by all three types of data collection: interview, 
observation and document analysis methods. Document analysis was used to more 
directly understand incentives such as financial, infrastructural and ESA compliance 
related incentives of participation. Documents were originally reviewed as a framework 
for general understanding of the Program and to develop interview questions. Documents 
were also reviewed to flag relevant sections for coding and analysis. This was then honed 
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after the interview process in which participants identified the importance of various 
documents.  
 In all, thirteen interviews were conducted with representatives of stakeholder 
organizations of the MRGESCP. Because of their positions’ importance in literature, 
some parties not officially members of the collaborative program were also interviewed. 
Interviews were limited to members of the sixteen stakeholder organizations or peripheral 
organizations that were either directly influential in the decision making process or 
potentially influenced the process through other-than-collaborative methods. Some 
important, higher ranking representative voices are not included in this work through 
failure of one kind or another to schedule their interviews. Often this was attributed to 
busy schedules, but may also have resulted from an interest in not being interviewed. 
 The analytical framework for evaluating incentives for investment mobilization 
divided incentives into two categories: those that can be described as investment 
mobilizing and those that can be described as investment hindering. Incentives that 
mobilize investment were seen as those that contributed to proactive collaborative 
development of effective institutions for accomplishing ESA goals and the protection of 
social and economic viability simultaneously.  Investment hindering incentives are 
incentives to prolong delay of action, participate with minimal investment in (free-ride), 
or attempt to scuttle collaboration or specific program elements that threaten a particular 
party’s interests. The rationale for specific words is found in Freeman (2010) as the word 
“mobilize” is consistently used to describe the process of investment and “hinder” is a 
near-antonym.
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Figure 3: Analytic Framework 
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To develop the analytical framework further, these two categories of incentives 
were divided into incentives based in interest, cooperative relationship building and 
pressure. The analytical framework informed the questions asked during semi-structured 
interviews. These questions were asked in person and responses recorded or hand written. 
These questions are listed in Appendix A and followed by an outline of the analytic 
framework, each component of which is linked in the appendix to the appropriate 
question. 
The analytical framework was used to develop the final codebook used for 
analysis in the qualitative research software. Upon interaction with empirical data, it was 
necessary to condense analytical categories in the final codebook based on their presence, 
absence, or duplication. The final analytic codes in the codebook used were also 
condensed based on the need to use them only in identification of a relationship. For 
example, incentives related to relationships would simply be coded: RELationship. This 
is because in coding text, it is important to avoid specificity (good verses bad 
relationship) but simply use the relationship to refer to the specific piece of text. This is 
because the narrative description to be generated is in the text itself and is qualitative in 
nature. Further details of how the analytical framework and code book were used are 
described in the data analysis process that follows. 
Analysis of data was conducted using multiple methods. Qualitative research 
software Atlas TI v.6. was used to understand relationships between codes derived from 
the analytic categories laid out above and logistical and subject-position categories that 
are detailed in the final code book in Appendix A.  
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The Atlas analysis process involves the development of three categories of codes: 
Subject-position, Logistical and Analytical. Subject Position codes designate the actor or 
person speaking such as an interview respondent according to their affiliation or position 
from which they are answering. An example subject position for this research would be 
“Non-Federal Actor”. Others are “Federal Action Agency” and “Strong Need for (ESA) 
Coverage.” Subject position codes combined to describe a specific stakeholder based on 
identity and structural factors. 
Logistical Codes identify the source of the text or dialogue being analyzed based 
on its origin in the data collection process. This could mean that it tells the analyst 
whether the information was taken from field notes or a reflection journal, observation or 
interview data or whether the conversation took place in an official or informal setting 
such as in a meeting or over dinner.  
Finally, Analytical Codes are based on the researcher’s criteria for analysis. For 
purposes of this research, these were the categories outlined above (mobilizing versus 
hindering: interest, relationship and pressure categories for each). These analytical 
themes were amended as necessary since part of the preliminary process of applying 
these codes is that understanding the empirical situation being researched is altered by 
their application. This is simply a function of education that a researcher undergoes while 
attempting to understand the phenomenon of concern. The coding process can be iterative 
and may involve the re-organization or complete re-creation of the coding system, as 
more is understood (Isaac pers com 2012).  
Codes were then applied to the data (such as program documents, interview 
transcriptions or observation notes) so that text was comprehensively coded under the 
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researchers system. From these coded texts, relationships were developed for codes and 
their intersection with others. Theories were developed to describe the relationships 
illustrated by these intersections and the researcher’s new understanding was applied to 
further development of the coding framework and theories regarding the phenomenon in 
question. This was achieved using an analysis matrix in which subject positions were 
compared to analytic themes and narratives developed based on the intersection of these 
themes and positions.  
Simultaneous to the Atlas process, an analysis notebook was created in which a 
section was devoted to each agency or entity interviewed, the Program as a whole, and 
the various themes being evaluated: exchanges/options developed, goals of the Program, 
burden of compliance, trust relationships, cost, adaptive management and scientific 
controversy and the transition to the RIP. During the coding process, specific narratives 
encountered in each interview, observation or document analysis was noted in the 
pertinent section. In the case of sections regarding specific stakeholders, one half was 
devoted to statements made by the stakeholder regarding themselves and the other half to 
statements made about the stakeholder by other individuals. In this way, an organized 
narrative, based on empirical data was developed for each stakeholder or theme. Each 
was summarized and developed into the final results and discussion section. 
Since rigor in qualitative research is of the utmost importance, two journals were 
kept to affectively demonstrate current efforts and ideas as the project progressed (Isaac 
pers com 2012). This ensured a “paper trail” that chronicles the history of the project as it 
evolved. One journal was for collecting field data. The other journal was for informal 
reflection, ideas and recording advisory meetings with committee members. Journals, 
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voice data and transcriptions were available to advisory faculty for verification, and upon 
completion of the research were destroyed per confidentiality protocols.
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6. Results 
 
Figure 4: Analytic Themes in 
Approximate Empirical Interaction 
Post-analysis understanding of 
the Analytic Themes suggests that 
many (at least presently) fall on 
the side of Investment Hindering 
Incentive. Mobilizing components 
affect all interactions but do not 
dominate participants’ 
sentiments toward the Program 
as a whole reflected in the 
dominance of Hindering 
Incentives (negatively stated) in 
the Program category.
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Risk and incentive play a convoluted role in the dynamics of the MRGESCP. For 
simplicity’s sake risk and incentive are collectively referred to as “incentives” which are 
either mobilizing or hindering. It is important to note that it is an exogenous force, the 
ESA that originally compels all parties to the table and how this shaped and shapes 
interaction. The dynamic created by this fact is one of defensive positioning in which all 
parties can basically be divided into two camps within a legally compelled collaboration. 
There are those attempting primarily to preserve a social or economic good and those 
attempting primarily to preserve an environmental good. Social and environmental 
incentives then, end up reflecting this division and both are collectively preservative. 
These three categories make up Interest based incentives which go to influence the 
relationships present in the Program.   
On one side of the relationship-based incentives that influence the program are 
collaboration-based incentives that at various times in the Program’s history and, 
participants hope, in its future have contributed to investment in institutional supply. On 
the other side are incentives related to the Program’s structural realities that participants 
generally described as problematic and that diminish the value of the collaboration-based 
incentives. These Program-related incentives are negatively influenced by a three-way 
reinforcing relationship between structural elements comprised of power, advantage, and 
cost related incentives. Each of these categories was originally assigned to relationship-
based, interest- based and pressure-based respectively in the Analytic Framework.  The 
relationship between these three is seen to negatively affect trust which in turn influences 
Program related incentives. Simultaneously, the relationship influences financial and 
legal coverage under the Program and dictates the level of pressure imposed on 
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participants to effectively attend to the goals of the Program. Coverage and pressure 
could be affected by incentives to produce mutually gainful options (incentive building) 
and mobilize investment. These incentive building exercises are reportedly rare. The 
conglomerate interaction of hindering influences appears to stifle investment in the sense 
that investment changes the status quo. This reinforces some participants’ assertion that 
the overriding factor influencing the Program is coverage. It complicates the development 
of pro-active, problem solving institutions and likely reinforces the status-quo as benefits 
more powerful interests at the table.  
Subject position codes developed in Chapter 5 are used to identify quotations 
throughout Chapter 6. In section 6.5 they are used in combination to more specifically 
define stakeholders’ subject positions and compare and categorize their statements. 
Subject positions from Chapter 5 include:  FRA Federal Regulatory/Action Agency, NFA 
Non-Federal Actor, SNC Strong Need for Coverage, WNC Weak Need for Coverage, 
EXST – Has some exogenous/internal structural advantage, RESources- Has resources, 
either water, land, monetary, DUPlicative- Disadvantageous or secondary (less 
influential) dual representative. Only FRA and NFA are used to identify quotations. 
 
6.1 Interest Based Incentives 
 Interest based incentives characterized stakeholders based on their primary 
missions as entities and how those factors drew each to the collaborative process. In 
actuality, these incentives are preservative incentives that initially divide participants into 
two camps based on environmental or social interest.  
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6.1.1 Environmental Concern Based Incentives 
ENV 
Entities with a primary concern of protection of species tended to find the 
Collaborative Program to lack proper incentives for their participation or to be muddled 
in ineffective activity: 
 “If you asked anyone, what are the institutions that (A) exist to benefit the river or 
(B) that implement policies that provide secure water for the river, the answer 
would be they don’t exist.” NFA 
 “The Collaborative Program is a vehicle of the status quo” NFA 
 “We don’t have the resources. They (agents of the status-quo) have all the 
resources in the world.” NFA 
 “They can meet forever and ever and ever and this gets back to one of the 
problems of collaboration in this context, in this sort of setting is, our enemy is 
time. Their ally is time.” NFA 
 “They would basically like to use the RIP to protect their water uses, current 
water uses and contribute a little bit to recovery but they lack this commitment, 
that our goal is to recover endangered species, that’s not their goal and its quite 
obvious its not” FRA 
 “My personal disenchantment, when I realized that this was never going to be 
truly collaborative, that this was going to be, you know some kind of old school 
bureaucratic hybrid was when Domenici’s aid said well the senator can’t just 
keep, well this is just not sustainable to have this funding come through as a 
congressional add every year, we want to get a charter for the program and we 
can’t just have these discussion groups, we’ve got to have only the top dogs that 
can make the decisions making the decisions” NFA 
 
The structure of the program is seen to be heavily weighted in favor of interests 
with power and resources. These interests, as illustrated in Chapter 4.3 tended not to 
favor environmental causes, but economic. Entities with other primary stated 
motivations, stated environmental incentives as secondary and in defense of their 
operations: 
 
 “Generally bringing the SJCP water down to where its taken out is overall very 
favorable for the species” NFA 
 “Half of the water withdrawn at the diversion is returned back at the reclamation 
plant, that is really the only effect” NFA 
  
 
52 
 “So I think in collaboration we can all help each other and we can provide the 
protection to the silvery minnow and we can protect our interest also.” NFA 
 “(MRGCD water) does get to the fish…so one of the ironies that I think that 
MRGCD sees is that a lot of that return flow water, its going to go back to the 
river but its sort of a willy nilly.” NFA 
 
One participant described a dynamic based on the scope of the ESA that limits its 
ability to attend to the problems that altered the river in the first place such as the 
building of large scale flood control and impoundment features that permanently altered 
river geomorphology. Since the building of these structures is seen by the ESA as action 
which no longer involves federal agencies, it cannot force alteration of the activities (i.e. 
structure removal/alteration). The functional scope of the ESA is then limited to water 
management. Since much of water management can be claimed to be beneficial to 
species, partner representatives can claim that they have only limited responsibility while 
continuing to manage water under their regular operations. The above comments also 
allude to a lack of understanding of how species needs may interplay with water 
infrastructure and return flow dynamics. 
6.1.2 Social System Related Incentives 
SOC 
 
 Those entities primarily concerned with provision of water for human uses cited 
numerous social incentives including economics, obligatory duties to water users, 
heritage and tradition: 
 
 “Yes, yes it could affect farmers businesses you know depending  on how it is 
being implemented in the future, like so far we have been able to survive and we 
are still doing our business, but people have to change their way of providing their 
businesses providing the resources they need” NFA 
  “I think that a we have responsibilities that we need to continue to do so a, for 
example our obligations (to constituents)” NFA 
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  “The water rights in the MRG are some of the oldest in the state of New Mexico. 
They are older than almost anything in Northern New Mexico with the exception 
of some of the ones around Espanola and up around the Chama.” NFA 
 “There are friends of mine that have water rights that date to 1796 and earlier. So 
there is documented evidence of diversion irrigation in the middle valley in my 
area, dating back 5000 years.” NFA 
 The pueblos and pre-puebloan peoples were indeed diverting river water for 
agriculture long before anyone else was here. And you know when the 
conquistadors came through and they stood on the hill by ABQ, they estimate 
25,000 acres under irrigation when they arrived.” NFA 
 “…uncompensated takings and having the people that own the water rights get 
their water moved around without any idea what the heck was going on? Getting 
blessed with Klamath?” NFA 
 
There are multiple facets to the interactions between stakeholders with primarily 
social or economic goals. Some of these entities are more or less influential than others. 
Some are municipal agencies while others are organizations that represent a specific 
cultural group such as irrigators or tribes. While each agency has a constituency, it can be 
said that some groups, especially those that have a more representational than resource 
management related goal, feel more connected to tradition than others. In some cases, a 
conflict dynamic is established when a more representational and a more resource 
management oriented entity both represent the same constituency or resource. Conflicts 
or alliances can arise.  
There is also an ongoing cultural shift in the MRG between the agricultural and urban 
way of life (Shively 2001). Individuals on either side of this divide can also find conflict 
and also have different levels of value they place on heritage and tradition.  
 
6.1.3 Other Preservative Incentives 
PRE 
 Other preservative incentives included protection of autonomy, interests, legal 
exposure, and financial resources:  
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 “And a, if we don’t work collaboratively there’s a chance that somebody else may 
get into your field and may impact on you indirectly.”NFA 
 “I think everyone has an interest in protecting their interest, and everyone also has 
interest in complying with the law. So those are two of the couple of things that 
keeps people together, if you can work collaboratively and each protect our own 
interests I think you have succeeded in some way.”NFA 
 “But I think there’s a lot of resistance to moving forward and having some belief 
that some of the things were doing could do some good, there seems to be so 
much reluctance to actually do anything until we know its going to do good, so its 
more internal to the collaborative program that’s been the problem I think.”NFA 
 
These kinds of preservative interests are less based on the specific social or 
environmental goals and have more to do with protection of finances, legal exposure 
or the ability of a given entity to maintain authority over its particularly area of 
responsibility without having to be dictated to by outside entities.  
6.2 Relationship Based Incentives 
6.2.1 Collaborative and Program Based Incentives 
COL 
 Collaboration, as a theoretical tool, was looked upon favorably by many 
participants. Where it was seen by some as “contextually ineffective,” the theory at least, 
was seen to have merits, if stated skeptically: 
 “Collaboration is the elixir of the status-quo…theories and collaboration all sound 
fine.” NFA  
 
Most participants found there to be some distance between collaboration in theory 
and in practice. By those who found it to be the best (or only non-litigious) option, 
collaboration was viewed as a tool for possible social learning, as a means of getting 
parties involved in decision-making and negotiation, and one that could improve 
efficiency of ESA implementation by streamlining agencies interactions and including 
non-federal actors in Section 7 consultation: 
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 “One thing I noticed with the collaboration are with the number of agencies 
getting involved we are getting expertise from different areas and when you get 
expertise you get new ideas, and that may be some silver lining for everybody.” 
NFA 
 Well that’s why we’re going to engage in collaboration, that’s why we’re going to 
argue about it, it may be good for you it may not be good for us, so you know we 
have to find some other solution to that, I think we are looking at consensus based 
solutions to the problems, and if we feel that this is really going to adversely 
affect us we’re going to stand up and say hey this is not the way it should work. 
NFA 
 “…it’s the best we’ve got…the collaboration isn’t going well it has a lot of 
structural problems….there is a long way we have to go…but we’re not going to 
make progress any other way FRA 
 “Our involvement more directly fit with working within the collaborative program 
because we have broad powers to obtain funds from the legislature.” NFA 
 “Reclamation and ISC put money into maintaining the pilot channel down into 
Elephant Butte, to make sure that there’s water that can be delivered to Elephant 
Butte. So all of those things sort of made it so that, there is a nexus with the, both 
the federal agencies” 
 “There is a mechanism by which non-fed entities can get federal coverage. You 
know the whole Section Ten piece, but the thought was that the non-fed folks 
would, through the nexus of the Collaborative Program would maybe achieve 
better synergy with the federal agencies umm, and go through the section seven 
process, which is kind of the federal process.” 
 
A number of factors go into making collaboration helpful. These factors, such as 
working relationships increase the ability of the program to transcend trust and other 
barriers to effective partnerships: 
 “Certainly its easier to have hostility towards someone you don’t know 
personally, so collaboration always helps in that sense.” FRA 
 “I spend more time with those people in the agencies and have known Jane Doe 
and the others over there for years. So we have a good working relationship. My 
management… have some different interpretations.” NFA 
 PRO 
 Where collaboration was seen as a positive theoretical framework, individuals 
were still prone to see it as insufficiently effective. This is largely because of the 
structural components of the Program that act as counterweight to productive 
collaboration. As mentioned above, Program related incentives were strongly affected by 
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trust and pressure dynamics, both strongly influenced by a feedback of hindering 
incentives comprised of power-, advantage- and cost-based incentives.  
As structural components of the Program that act as negative incentive these 
factors manifest as:  
 Foundational problems with how parties were initially compelled to the table in a 
“command and control fashion” that resulted in adversarial behavior 
 Lack of unifying Program objectives,  
 Disparity of individual partner stake in the Program  
 Funding Problems 
 Natural, Regulatory and Programmatic Uncertainty 
 
Foundational Problems with the Program: 
 
 “…got to the point through the lawsuits where the BOR, FWS and Corps, the 
three fed entities and the district and the ISC, the two principle non-fed entities 
came to the conclusion that somehow we could enter this collaborative program. 
Senator Domenici was very instrumental, basically I think he ordered us all into 
it.” NFA  
 “Well the main drivers of course are the federal agencies, you know it’s a federal 
law that we are trying to comply with.” NFA 
 “…enter the collaborative program, because clearly that wasn’t the way to 
manage a species. So in order to avoid some of these heinous things, there was 
legislation drafted.” NFA 
 
Two important factors that arise out of these statements are (1) that the problem itself 
(endangered species) was not something that participants would have necessarily known 
of or faced if not for the federal statute. This is significant because, as Ostrom (2009) 
points out, much of what can be achieved in collaboration is due to the fact that all parties 
are faced with tangible consequences if some alleviating action is not taken. In cases she 
describes, the consequences are physical and based on a commonly used resource such as 
groundwater which, if not for some rethinking of the extraction regime will run out. In 
the case that sanction under the ESA is the consequence, it may be that a controversial 
law, opposed in many places at the state and local levels is either ineffective at producing 
  
 
57 
dire circumstances or is more easily diffused through political activity than is feasible to 
force collective action. It may be that biodiversity loss itself is not as easily internalized 
as loss of a commodity such as groundwater. (2) Both by the ESA and congressional 
intervention, important structural elements of the Program are in essence pre-fabricated 
installations. The ESA, as described above, installed the problem/crisis at the regional 
level. This means that the problem itself could be seen to be invented in the eyes of those 
who do not have a direct interest in biodiversity.  
Senator Domenici’s protective interventions then dictated certain important structural 
rules for the game and initiated “collaboration” which, at that point in history was an 
established means of dealing with similar scenarios. What is important about pre-
fabricated installations here is that they are based on theories derived from the study of 
processes that developed organically in other situations. In Ostrom’s groundwater 
example, several adjacent groundwater basins were able to develop institutions that 
effectively recreated their extraction regimes in sustainable and cooperative ways. Their 
success prompted officials to export their functioning institutional framework to another 
basin nearly a hundred miles away which was suffering from similar problems to the ones 
faced by the original basins. In the second case, the cooperative framework failed 
resoundingly. The major factor of relevance to its failure one place and success in another 
is the lack of organic, collaborative development of institutions in the failed basin. The 
failed basin was being managed with an imported system that might have been 
structurally sound, but was not a product of the social and political situations at hand in 
that basin. There was simply a lack of investment. Similar problems may be present in 
the MRG. 
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Lack of Unifying Objective 
 
 Two consistent themes in the interview process seemed to fall hand in hand. First 
was the absence of a unifying goal, and second, the means by which to unify parties 
around multiple necessary goals. Often this was stated in terms of a want for leadership, 
be it a third party or FWS in the form of solid guidelines for compliance.  
 “Incentives, strong leadership, clear vision, if I don’t have those elements, and by 
clear vision I mean someone who is ready to implement it, institutional 
mechanisms to allow for the implementation, political will … you look at the 
table…you look at the players at the table, are they people who you think of as 
creative collaborative types when push comes to shove… 
 “The intent of Program participants is two-fold: first, to prevent extinction, 
preserve reproductive integrity, improve habitat, support scientific analysis, and 
promote recovery of the listed species within the Program area in a manner that 
benefits the ecological integrity, where feasible, of the Middle Rio Grande 
riverine and riparian ecosystem; and, second, to exercise creative and flexible 
options so that existing water uses continue and future water development 
proceeds in compliance with applicable federal and state laws. To achieve these 
ends, the Program may not impair state water rights or federal reserved water 
rights of individuals and entities; federal or other water rights of Indian nations 
and Indian individuals, or Indian trust assets; San Juan-Chama Project contractual 
rights; and the State of New Mexico’s ability to comply with Rio Grande 
Compact delivery obligations.” Bi-Laws (MRGESCP 2009) 
 “The goals are clear enough, but they are conflicting goals. They are goals that by 
their very nature are going to conflict, which and, that introduces the problem in a 
collaborative program because you’ve got three different goals that are in conflict 
with each other and you’ve got all these different entities that, each and every one 
of those entities probably has one of those goals in mind.” NFA  
 “There is not this commitment by entering the program to address this one stated 
goal.  You’ve got the water users come in, they’re goal is to protect existing and 
future uses, and you’ve got the Service and a few other entities in there, “our goal 
is to recover the species” okay we are both speaking a different language and 
there’s a little overlap, I mean, there’s two circles and they’re kind of you know 
kind of coming a little bit together but they’re not fully overlapped by any 
means.” NFA 
 “The collaborative program could be a wonderful success if everyone was 
working toward the same goal and trusted each other.” NFA 
 “(Okay so that’s kind of like having a very specific goal) yes very much so, 
otherwise you spend each year trying to comply with the BO and that’s a good 
thing to do but for 17 or 18 signatories its very hard to do.” NFA 
 “ If there is not a clear vision of what is trying to be accomplished and strong 
leadership to get there that’s different from the status quo, then the forces who are 
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most resistant to change and most in favor of maintaining the status quo will 
prevail.” NFA 
 “ Nobody agrees on what’s to be done?” NFA 
 “So far, so much of what has happened in the Collaborative Program is fighting 
over science. How much water does the fish need and how do you count fish. 
Those are the two questions they seem to fight about the most and when you are 
fighting over those questions instead of pooling your resources and saying hey 
lets figure this out, let pool our resources, lets get water over here, lets do this 
change in the channel in the river and lets just start doing stuff, instead.” FRA 
 
Disparity of individual partner stake in the Program  
 
 Disparity in Partner stake can be seen to manifest from two perspectives. First, 
there are parties with a great deal of influence, who control resources and who have a 
great deal of legal stake for the consequences of their actions. Arising from them are 
concerns over what kind of entities (based on influence) should be allowed at the table. 
While these entities represent a constituency, they are seen by some other entities as 
improperly representing it. They are seen to be neglectful of interests with less influence 
regardless of valid concerns they may bring. 
 These other parties tend to be less influential in the collaborative forum but may 
have less ability to discount results that are unfavorable to them. This is true in the case 
of irrigators whose livelihood depends on their water rights or ENGO’s whose main 
mission may be compromised by collaborating in an unsympathetic forum.  
There is also the phenomenon of shared responsibility in which coverage under the 
ESA is provided by the Program, but coverage and cost are equalized where culpability 
in detrimental activities may be highly differential from party to party. 
 “What has UNM got to lose? Or to Gain by participation in this program?...” NFA 
 “We talk about the big six or the big five. That’s kind of language that’s batted 
around a lot in the meetings that we have, the Corps and the bureau and the FWS 
and the District and the ISC and the Attorney General’s office. Kind of referred to 
now as the big six. It was the big five and then NMAG started paying more 
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attention to things....But see we are the ones that have resources and we have 
missions.” NFA 
 “There are too many groups in the program that don’t offer anything. I’ll just be 
blunt. But they can come to the Executive Committee and tie the works up. You 
know and that’s, I don’t think that’s right. I think you want to have stakeholders, 
but you want to have stakeholders that are able to help solve the problem and not 
just obfuscating the problem.” NFA 
 “We feel that one individual farmer or one individual pueblo that can tie that up is 
probably not the best way to be collaborative.” NFA 
 “The federal agencies, I mean they basically are the ones who have the primary 
responsibility for compliance with ESA.” NFA 
 “The City’s exposure for coverage, the need to be in the program for coverage is 
not a really extreme need, it’s a passing need but it really wouldn’t want to drop 
out of the program because so much happens in the Rio Grande basin in the Metro 
area that it has got to have direct involvement in some of this activity.” NFA 
 “The disproportionate part has to do with resources and control.” NFA 
 “My suspicion is that the program itself won’t be able to continue because of the 
mismatch between what coverage you need and why you’d be in the program at 
all if you didn’t need coverage.” NFA 
 “We are all going to court and the big boys are going to try to strike deals.”NFA 
 “Reclamation is going to end up holding the bag.” FRA 
 
 Funding Problems 
 
 The two major problems of funding for the program are (1) the retirement of 
Senator Domenici, who as Chair of Appropriations was able to direct a great deal of 
federal money to the program and (2) the steep decline in federal funding due to national 
economic factors. A third problem, that of federal inefficiency will be dealt with in the 
section 6.3.3. 
 “…is trying to move from this collaborative effort to what is called a RIP which 
has been done around the county for other fish, but we have to get that 
institutionalized by congress so the funding level gets a little more regular.” NFA 
 “The Collaborative Program did well for many years because of Senator 
Domenici’s direct intervention in federal funding procedures and apparatus. But 
now that’s gone. So funding has gone down terrifically in the last couple of years 
since he’s been gone.” NFA 
 “…and money because they’ve (other programs) got those power generation 
projects and such and they bleed off that. So they’ve got water and money. The 
Platte has water. I mean, we don’t have either one and when the budget got 
  
 
61 
reshuffled the Middle Rio Grande took a disproportionate hit in the budget 
reshuffle than the other areas” NFA 
 “Well part of the problem is that the people who are making decision about where 
collaborative, where funding goes, which projects get funded, they are conflicted 
because they want to get their own projects funded, so there’s a problem there’s a 
conflict problem with making those kinds of budget decisions.” FRA 
 
Natural, Regulatory and Programmatic Uncertainty 
 
Natural Uncertainty 
 Climate change is expected to dramatically affect the MRG and current drought 
conditions have many participants wondering how an already strained hydrologic system 
can produce what the Program needs in annual “wet” water. 
 “…its already the second week in February and the big storms are not lining up. 
Its just not going to be there. So the program is starting to look at what we can do 
for the minnow in that set of circumstances, do we have the water, can we get the 
water to have a spike and have some recruitment and slow that down so we can 
try and get some fish back out there, thing like that, those are ongoing within the 
program now.” FRA 
Regulatory Uncertainty 
Participants continually cite the need for clearer obligations to be identified by FWS 
in terms of what it takes to comply with the ESA. As the process of consultation re-
initiates, compliance standards, annual metrics for compliance are frequently discussed. 
 “…it will probably end up going to litigation. I wouldn’t bet on it succeeding. The 
only way it would succeed is if there was major clarity and 100% commitment in 
terms of what was being laid down by the regulatory agencies and then buy in 
from agencies with all the resources and from what I can tell they are too far apart 
to close that gap now.” FRA 
 “…because I think that the one thing that would be the savior is for FWS, because 
they are the regulator, for FWS to be completely transparent and come clean on 
what it takes to comply.” NFA 
 “…right the draft opinion, they want to see a draft opinion before they make their 
final commitments.” FRA 
 “People don’t want to sign on to the RIP until they know what the service really 
wants and that’s, to me that’s fair, you know I mean, well I signed up to 
contribute to this, well to contribute to what? Well nobody does that you know, so 
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this, the service is helping to draft the RIP document. The RIP documents, to be 
realistic and here is really what we think you can do. But until people know what 
the speeding ticket is, you know you can’t decide whether to pay it or not.” NFA 
 “Fish and wildlife sort of should be playing the role of the scientists, you know 
the investigators, the ones who are very curious about is this working? is this not 
working? They don’t seem to be that way and they do some research stuff. They 
have done some stuff on the ground but there is very little communication with 
the collaborative program. And there seems to be a real reluctance to kind of go 
beyond what has already been established as what the minnow’s needs are and in 
some ways a little bit of a refusal that there is a hydrologic reality that we have to 
work with and that there may be some things we can do different that still allow 
the species and the ecosystem to recover a little bit.” NFA 
Programmatic Uncertainty 
 Due to the complexity of the Program’s current transitional state and the level of 
fatigue that apparently accompanies it, some members believe it may be too much for the 
organization to handle. There are also issues of program structure and its effects on 
accountability that threaten to diminish any reforms that may be accomplished by the 
establishment of the RIP. 
 “ My personal perception of it is that the program is verging on kind of imploding 
sort of falling in on itself due to the sheer weight of things that it has to do, how 
much its trying to do at one time and the amount of party lines that all the 
agencies are now sort of setting up party lines.” NFA 
 “I think its both quantitative and qualitative, quantitative in the sense that there is 
too much at once and qualitative in the sense that the things that are happening all 
at the same time are inherently so difficult on their own that when you compound 
them then you’ve really got it rolled up, so its like I don’t know what, like going 
through a divorce and putting your kids through college. They’re independent but 
they are so big that how do you solve one without the other or independently?” 
NFA 
 “So every signatory now is going to have to sign its own agreement, apart from 
signing on as being part of the RIP, then every individual signatory is going to 
have to sign separate agreements and so there’s hidden costs that are going to be 
shared that were never revealed at the beginning.” NFA 
 “It may be that this is dealt with in their individual management agreement with 
the Program(for membership in the RIP). So you see there is a blanket agreement 
that all the signatories sign on and then there’s individual agreements that all of us 
negotiate on our own that we don’t know what the other entities are having to 
negotiate. So very, see this is why merely proposing one structure (the RIP) to 
replace another structure (the MRGESCP) is not a guarantee that its any better 
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because they set up a system that there’s a certain amount that’s out in the open 
and then the rest of it the real nitty gritty is all done behind closed doors and we 
don’t know what the other person is negotiating.” NFA 
 “Its too far to turn back as far as the transition, we let a one year clock run for a 
year and a half and we are just simply out of time. And the number of things that 
are still unresolved have piled up and we are not going to get them solved any 
faster doing things the old way.” NFA 
 “The protection against litigation ends on March 16 and they have now created a 
timeline that allows seven months for lawsuits to be filed by the Environmental 
Community.”NFA 
 The Doe lawsuit against MRGCD, Texas Lawsuit against NM on the Rio Grande, 
these are huge, huge things that change everything about water in the river, 
everything.” NFA 
 “The collaboration isn’t going well it has a lot of structural problems, there is a 
long way we have to go, but we’re not going to make progress any other way. So 
we have to find a way to make it work, we are all in this together. And the 
collaborative program also was determined to not be working and this was part of 
the impetus for the RIP.” FRA 
  “So many people are still so entrenched in their own agency viewpoints, and its 
from both sides its from the species side and from the water users side, we both 
go in there, all of us enter these processes to protect our own interests first and 
people have not yet adopted this mindset that we are going into this to solve the 
problem as opposed to protect our own interests and I think until you can get past 
that, that philosophical barrier than I don’t think it matters how much time you 
put in, its not going to make any difference in the outcome.” NFA 
 
6.2.2 Trust Based Incentives 
REL 
 
Trust is a dynamic factor in the MRGESCP. Because of the collaborative nature 
of the process, trust building takes place in the forum of “working relationships.” 
Individuals felt they had a much better concept of the interests of other parties, 
understanding of individual personalities and felt a general sense that it was harder to 
distrust or dislike someone you were actually interacting with though interactions still 
proceeded in wariness: 
 “Certainly its easier to have hostility towards someone you don’t know 
personally, so collaboration always helps in that sense, but I think we are in a trust 
yet verify situation, none of the parties are going to trust another party implicitly.” 
FRA 
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 “All parties have learned a lot about what each of what our individual agencies do 
and what our perspectives are. You know maybe there is an inherent amount of 
trust just by understanding. But I still see a huge amount of distrust going on 
between you know the non fed folks and even the fed folks. A lot of it is aimed at 
the FWS as the regulatory agency in the room, so yah I don’t know. To some 
degree there has been some trust building, but probably not as much as needs to 
be.” FRA 
 “Even reclamation is going to slicing and dicing, you know drought tends to 
really accentuate peoples differences too so I think the fact that we are going 
through this at the same time there is a drought makes the trust a little more 
tenuous and a, but at the same time I think as long as there is that core program I 
think you sort of have to trust that eventually you’ll get there and I think that 
everybody feels that way.” NFA 
 “ …but at my level yes (there is trust). But the reason is because I spend more 
time with those people in the agencies.” NFA 
 
At the same time, progress that is made through working together is countered by 
trust issues stemming from:  
 Cost 
 Protection of interests 
 Inconsistency of agencies and individuals 
 Partner Agency to Partner Agency Dynamics and 
 Individual personalities 
 
Cost related trust issues 
 
 Partners see cost affecting trust in two ways. (1) Trust is tested in times of limited 
financial resources as cooperation and agreement over how to spend funds is strained. (2) 
Past spending for various functions is harder to justify when results for the spending are 
not seen.  
 “Okay so I do believe there are trust issues but I think that people are generally 
trying to work on those. The question becomes as we go to a RIP with less money 
to do more things, what’s going to happen?” NFA 
 “Trust or distrust has always been a significant factor. It has been an undercurrent 
in our end relationships as far back as I can remember. So it isn’t like trust 
suddenly emerged as being a big issue. Its always been there, its just what form it 
takes. Trust or distrust has gotten magnified more recently, primarily because of 
the dwindling of the other most-scarce resource beside water and that’s money.” 
NFA 
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 “…the collaborative program says oh yeah we are going to do restoration in the 
Albuquerque reach, the City places it here, and for that million dollars, 25% of it 
had to be in-kind contributions from the non-federal entities. We are on a 25% 
cost share which is a screaming deal, but 25% of that million dollars is paid by 
people like me’s tax dollars or actually state of New Mexico because ISC has 
footed  a large part of the cash bill” NFA 
 “We have spent $170 million and the minnow is doing worse than it has ever, 
since we started measuring it, its at its lowest numbers. So that’s one thing its just 
all this effort that we have put into it hasn’t secured the future for the minnow.” 
FRA 
Protection of interests related trust issues 
 
Partner’s tend to believe that most Program participants would do what they could to 
protect their interests first. They did not trust that their interests would necessarily be 
accounted for by parties other than themselves. 
 “I think, I am sure everybody is going to protect their interests, whether it is done 
through collaboration or it is done through the legal system or it is done through 
administrative process.” NFA 
 “People don’t want to sign on to the RIP until they know what the service really 
wants.”  NFA 
 “You mean through uncompensated takings and having the people that own the 
water rights get their water moved around without any idea what the heck was 
going on?” NFA 
 “Everybody is playing a game, trying to maintain what they, what rights and 
abilities they have, you know to serve their constituents and to meet these needs 
and collaborate and there is a balance on everybody’s part.” FRA 
 “…but the real reason that everyone is there is to cover their own asses and 
people have a hard time moving off of that into a truly collaborative program.” 
FRA 
Inconsistency of agencies and individuals 
 
 Inconsistency was reported as a function of both agency personnel turnover and as 
a problem of unclear trajectory on the part of agencies, especially FWS. 
 “You know it depends on the personalities more than anything else…the district is 
probably kind of unusual in this in that just probably because of Doe, Doe’s been 
there forever. There is no change at the district. It’s a very conservative, old 
fashioned kind of glacial pace. The same people have been around for this 
through the whole process. But at the Bureau on the other hand, every two or 
three years there is a new area manager. Some of them we’ve gotten along really 
well, some of them I trusted implicitly. Some of them I just didn’t trust. The 
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Corps, what is it every eighteen months they change colonels? And they always 
send in a good person, umm but there’s that period of change when a new face 
shows up and they don’t have twelve years experience with all this and there’s all 
these relationships going back and there is a constant turnover of personalities and 
personnel and it takes a while to get you know, to kind of feel out those new 
personalities....you meet these people and you spend more time in meetings with 
them and you have some discussion with them outside the program meetings and 
eventually you decide whether you can trust them or not.” NFA 
 “So I have often tried to ask the right questions at the right time and you often 
find you don’t really get the right answer. But it’s a repetitive kind of cycle that 
after awhile you get a little disillusioned about it. Somebody says well we’ve 
really looked at it and we’ve decided that creating the RIP is the easiest and best 
thing to do right now. And they lay out what is generally involved and that sounds 
good actually and let’s get that started a year ahead of time, and then a whole year 
goes by and you are really not as close as you should be after a year and then you 
find out that there are a whole lot of other details involved. So every signatory 
now is going to have to sign its own agreement, apart from signing on as being 
part of the RIP, then every individual signatory is going to have to sign separate 
agreements and so there’s hidden costs that are going to be shared that were never 
revealed at the beginning, so there’s all sorts of stuff that happens like that.” NFA 
 “So we were kind of led far down that path (the RIP) by the service and then they 
stepped way away from it like it was a lump of kryptonite or something like that, 
it’s a mysterious process to watch…” NFA 
 “But you know things are all up in the air now. The current plan, you know, 
reclamation was planning to propose the RIP in its new plan and that’s what we 
were going to do consultation over, plus the water ops plus the RIP and now, you 
know at the last meeting they told everyone that they are going to pull back and 
not, they are going to pull the RIP out of their proposal” NFA 
Partner Agency to Partner Agency Dynamics  
 
 Many of the agency to agency trust dynamics were the products of historical 
interaction. The historical state versus federal conflicts appeared in this context. They 
also relate to the above category of protection of interests. 
 “When Pete Domenici announced his retirement, the reaction in the room was 
blatant. The next meeting of the collaborative program, the gloves were off, 
because now Domenici wasn’t here to protect anybody any more and FWS went 
“oh my God they don’t have anyone to protect them anymore, now we can really 
go after, we think,  you know they’ve been hiding water on us all along.” NFA 
 “I think because a lot of people complain that what the service has been 
mandating is draconian and not based on sound science.” FRA 
 “Because the conservancy district survives primarily by shifting responsibilities 
onto others. That’s how they have survived for eighty-five years and its not going 
to change.” NFA 
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 “Honestly it has to do with them being given a 180 degree different directive at 
higher political levels, so a really good example was, and this was about a year 
ago, they came and they made a really hard pitch that they were going to be the 
agency that should manage the RIP. They had presentations they had handouts, 
this has been done elsewhere, this is the best way to go and there was severe push 
back because all of the non-feds don’t want to have a federal agency involved in 
it” NFA 
 “Are there trust issues within the Collaborative Program? Yeah for sure there is, 
especially between the ISC and the service, there are some others. The District 
doesn’t really trust anybody. And I am not picking on anybody. If that’s the way 
they choose to run their program and operate in the Collaborative Program then 
okay and that’s what the rest of us have to get around.”NFA 
Individual personalities 
 
 Non-federal entities especially emphasized the importance of personalities to 
dynamics in the Program. On several occasions these were implicated in broader 
conspiracy ideas, perceived problems of discount rate and general dishonesty. 
 “…and whether or not when somebody says something, is it really what they 
mean or is there some kind of maneuver involved, you know its constant kind of 
calculations that are involved you know. So there’s also thematically, there is the 
difference between what an agency says it needs to do in terms of its policies or 
its party line and then how it is that the individuals themselves carry that mandate 
out. So sometimes you’ve got an agency that really is difficult to work with but 
you’ve got some people in there that are willing to kind of overcome that on an 
interpersonal level and you can get further. And it can be completely the opposite 
way around where you’ve got agencies where their mission is kind of down the 
middle…but there individual actors are, you sometimes wonder if what they are 
saying is just constantly their personal opinion or whether they are speaking on 
behalf of the agency. And so there’s this frequent thing that somebody will come 
to a meeting and say well this is what we are going to do and then you find out 
that behind the scenes that they are saying the total opposite to people or they 
have subcommittee meetings and they are saying one thing in front of a big group 
and behind closed doors in a smaller setting, you know its just on and on and well, 
how do I know what, who the real whoever is?... I have tried to follow the 
statements of different people in different settings and finally figured out that 
there are people who are just damned good at saying totally different things in 
totally different settings. Its amazing to me.” NFA 
 “… is an extraordinarily political guy who does not live within the benefitted area 
of the district.” NFA 
 “… you can’t tell me that if someone in her position wanted to put the cards on 
the table she could either do it or if she didn’t have the authority to go to someone 
like John Doe and say to make this work, this is really what we need to do and do 
it.” NFA 
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6.3 Relationship/Interest/Pressure Intersection: Power/Advantage/Cost 
 
 Integral to relationships and Program structural elements that affect incentives to 
invest in the MRGESCP are three interactive factors of power-, advantage- and cost-
based incentives.  Each of these factors came from one of the three divisions of this 
study’s Analytic Framework: relationship, interest and pressure respectively. They are 
presented together before explaining pressure-based incentives (following Figure 4) to 
explain how they affect Pressure-based incentives that in turn affect the structure of the 
program as a whole.  
6.3.1Power Dynamics Based Incentives 
POW 
 Important power-based incentives exist for the federal regulator, action agencies 
as well as existed for former Senator Domenici in how to initiate and manage the 
Program. For the Service, the power lies in having ultimate say in how compliance for 
the ESA will be met by all regulated parties.  For Reclamation, power exists in deciding 
how and what to fund as it supplies much of the current Project funding. For Senator 
Domenici, senior senator and Appropriations Chair with strong ties to the State and City, 
power lied in the ability to draft legislation that superseded the court and exempted action 
agencies from litigation under the 2003 BO. These three factors have a lasting influence 
on the structure of the program and thus advantage and integrally important, cost 
provision: 
 
 “as an example with FWS…they can mandate that water be used and the agencies 
that control water can just be told.” NFA 
 “The ESA says thou shalt and they can require pretty much anything of the 
federal entities to make it happen but there is more leniency to the local entities.” 
FRA 
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 “We’re okay with reclamation using a $9-10 million budget to fund projects, but 
the problem is of course, they have kind of veto power I guess on what that could 
be used for the funding is.” NFA 
  “Pete Domenici’s connections to Albuquerque were deep he owned property here 
he had been a CEO of the city of Albuquerque, he was a speculator in real estate 
here in Albuquerque, a lot of things about Pete Domenici…” NFA 
 “Senator Domenici was very instrumental, basically I think he ordered us all into 
it.  Okay, he said, here’s a way for you guys to all play nice and get along and do 
it. .” NFA 
 
6.3.2 Advantage Based Incentives 
ADV  
 Advantages that exist under the current structure, not only of the Program, but the 
entities at the table provide certain kinds of advantage within the framework of the 
program. These were identified by partners as: 
 Distribution of responsibility among all partners 
 Legislated exclusions of water resources that alter cost apportionment and parity 
differentially among stakeholders 
 The regulatory hierarchy which offers the Service disproportionate decision 
power and  
 The accountability structure of the program or various partners -some agencies 
are not easily held responsible for their activities. 
 
In the case of the Corps an advantage may be in their limited involvement in water 
operations: 
 “Problems with the species occur largely when the system runs out of water, 
referred to as the lower end of the hydrograph. Corps authorities really deal with 
the upper end of the hydrograph when there is too much water in the system, aka 
flood control. So clearly over the last ten years, the minnow and the flycatcher are 
in trouble, not because of large floods, but because of lack of water.” FRA 
 
Distribution of responsibility among all partners 
 
Distribution of responsibility is an advantage in that it allows the entire Program to 
attend to problems that may be caused by a single party that would have originally been 
that party’s duty to reconcile. As is shown in the cost section below, nearly all program 
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costs are borne by the federal government. This may alleviate direct costs to individuals 
whose activities may be responsible for species damage. 
 “We got to the point through the lawsuits where the BOR, FWS and Corps, the 
three fed entities and the district and the ISC, the two principle non-fed entities 
came to the conclusion that somehow we could enter this collaborative program.” 
NFA 
 “…the RIP as being something like setting up an insurance pool. So all of the 
agencies, all of the signatories are in as far as their liability, but what kind of 
coverage you get and how is radically disproportionate.” NFA 
Legislated exclusions of water resources that alter cost apportionment and parity  
differentially among stakeholders 
 
 As described previously, the minnow rider provided specific advantage to the 
users of SJCP water which could be leased to the federal government. This gave them a 
source of funding, protected their water uses and, some believe shifted the burden from 
all water users to agricultural users. Since most of the water used by the Program has 
been SJCP water, it also shifted a large amount of the funding burden to the federal tax 
payer and away from the non-federal water user. It sheltered all parties to the program 
from outside litigation through the end of the 2003 BO on March 16, 2013.  
 “(Reclamation) may not use discretion, if any, to restrict, reduce or reallocate any 
water stored in Heron Reservoir or delivered pursuant to San Juan-Chama Project 
contracts, including execution of said contracts facilitated by the Middle Rio 
Grande Project, to meet the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, unless 
such water is acquired or otherwise made available from a willing seller or lessor” 
(H.R. 2754-23§208) 
 “Complying with the reasonable and prudent alternatives and the incidental take 
limits defined in the Biological Opinion released by the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service dated March 17, 2003 combined with efforts carried out pursuant 
to Public Law 106-377, Public Law 107-66, and Public Law 108-7 fully meet all 
requirements of the Endangered Species Act” (H.R. 2754-23§208) 
 “…Domenici. So he went, to protect Albuquerque, he put a rider in on an 
appropriations bill that specified the SJCP water could not be used for endangered 
species, he took it off the table.” NFA 
 “…because it (Use of SJCP water) was the first time that agriculture had ever 
been, had any kind of parity with cities. Always in these things, agriculture pays, 
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and cities are the junior users and vote to have this crap in here and feel no pain 
from what they vote for.” NFA 
 “Reclamation’s primary contribution to the species is to take SJCP water and run 
it down the river to maintain flows in the summer time. Its SJCP water.” FRA 
 “A lot of that water was leased or used by Reclamation.” FRA  
The regulatory hierarchy which offers the Service disproportionate decision power  
 
 The Service’s advantage is simply that it is the regulatory agency. As a partner, it 
has a disproportionately powerful role in that it signs off on Program activities and their 
compliance with the ESA. 
 “…FWS who has almost ultimate control in a regulatory sense but doesn’t have to 
give up any resource what so ever in the process.” NFA  
 “FWS, there only downside is that if the whole thing blows up, they might be 
accused of having caused it to blow up, but they don’t have water using 
constituents, so they can mandate that water be used and the agencies that control 
water can just be told.” NFA 
 
 
 
The accountability structure of the program or various partners -some  
agencies are not easily held responsible for their activities. 
 
 Another form of advantage experienced by some partners is in a lack of 
accountability. Most notable is the MRGCD, which is most often cited as unaccountable. 
This serves to their advantage in that they are not easily litigated against. From both 
ENGO and irrigator perspectives, this is sheltering to the MRGCD. For ENGO’s, 
Reclamation is a better target with deep pockets, federal agency mandates under the ESA 
and potential ability to alter MRGCD water use. For irrigators, the complication is the 
lack of adjudication on the MRG. The MRGCD distributes what some believe to be 
senior appropriator’s water for species needs, while requiring end of season shortage 
sharing between junior and senior users. This is technically illegal and the lack of public 
records kept by the district is seen as an affront to senior right holders. Unfortunately, the 
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State of New Mexico is committed to not starting the adjudication process in the MRG 
and therefore cannot enforce priority. 
 “The MRGCD may have control over a lot of the water, but they aren’t going to 
give up anything for the sake of the program succeeding. Zero.” NFA 
 “They are quasi-municipal they can tax people, they can undertake, any kind of 
construction process on their own likes, and they don’t have that NEPA 
(requirement), you know (to) have to demonstrate that they’ve got the best 
alternative and that its not going to damage the environment. They don’t have that 
responsibility. So in a way its structure is kind of a Frankenstein. To whom are 
they accountable? Looking at things today they’ve got this elected board so 
there’s a lot more accountability evident in 2013 than there was in 2003.” NFA 
 “MRGCD is a black hole, they don’t keep public records of water they release for 
species needs.” NFA 
 “The conservancy district survives primarily by shifting responsibilities onto 
others. That’s how they have survived for eighty-five years and its not going to 
change…I mean it is in the gene pool, it is baked in the cake over there. I don’t 
care if you are reading some document from the 1930’s, 50’s,70’s, 90’s there are 
always saying that ain’t  our problem.”NFA 
 “They are in a unique position, they have never really had to answer to anybody 
because their return flows either do or don’t get down to Elephant Butte, ring the 
compact bell and all is well. They are not competing with anyone else. There is no 
accountability they have with anybody else about their water use. So since the 
20’s their operating paradigm has been take it all and let the return flow go to 
satisfy the state’s obligation.” NFA 
 “There really isn’t kind of a convenient (legal) handle on the district and then 
another thing is unlike a typical irrigation district that’s created at the behest or 
with cooperation of Reclamation, this was a creature of state law that has broader 
powers and a different organizational structure than an irrigation district.” NFA 
 
Reclamation is also cited as having an accountability related advantage in that it 
controls funding with very little outside oversight on where the money is spent. In 
this their inefficiencies are less likely to be controlled by other entities in the 
Program. 
 “The second problem is that the federal end, a tremendous amount of money has 
been directed toward the program from federal sources and when going through 
the Bureau’s contracting arm, it has a remarkable propensity to disappear…there 
isn’t any accountability, trying to see where the money went is an impossibility 
right now.” NFA 
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 “So I think part of it is that federal, you it just gets, it starts here and its just 
shrinks. And then in the end, when it finally gets funded, nobody even knows its 
been funded, nobody knows what its been funded for, nobody knows what 
direction its going, so there’s all these real issues that I don’t know how to fix, 
because I’ve been spending years trying to fix it with Reclamation.” NFA 
6.3.3 Cost Based Incentives (Pressure) 
COS 
 Provision of cost is one of the most important factors in the incentive structure of 
the program. Integrally intertwined with the above factors of power and advantage, cost 
provision plays a fundamental role in the level of pressure the Program exerts on 
participants and influences the trajectory of the collaborative process. Participant 
responses regarding cost focused on two important dynamics. (1) cost for program 
activities is dramatically disproportionate with nearly all cost borne by the federal 
government. (2) federal control of cost has resulted in inefficiency and unfair control over 
the process: 
 “...fundamental problems with the existing program. One of which is I believe the 
non-federal entities probably do not really pony up their fair share of cost. I think 
we have all, here’s this looking out for our own interests, I think we have all very 
successfully managed to shift all of the burden onto the federal tax payer. Sorry to 
say it, that’s what we do, but I don’t think its right. I think if we are going to be 
successful then more of the costs will have to be borne by the local interests. The 
second problem is that the federal end, a tremendous amount of money has been 
directed toward the program from federal sources and when going through 
Reclamation’s contracting arm, it has a remarkable propensity to disappear. It 
wouldn’t shock me to find out that maybe only 25% of the money that was 
directed into the collaborative program actually got used productively. A 
tremendous amount just goes to increasing federal staffing at Bureau and FWS. 
On the ground projects don’t happen all that much and when they do they are 
bloated with admin costs, so I see that as a big problem. So even though the 
Federal cost share is quite large what is accomplished with it is not.” NFA 
 
Cost Share for the program was decided to be 75% federal and 25% non-federal 
based on an expectation that New Mexico’s small economy would not be able to support 
much more of a contribution.  
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 “John Doe, so he’s been co-chairing, but a lot of funding comes through 
reclamation and I’m not as up to speed on that but Reclamation does get funding 
that then gets channeled through the CP and then they fund different projects and 
you know reclamation actually pays for a bunch of FWS staff positions, FTE’s 
and things like that” FRA 
 That cost share, I think there are a lot of good financial reasons for that, you know 
it might end up that there are higher contributions above and beyond 25%, 
anyway but we don’t have the kinds of industries that allow a 50/50, we are one 
small little state, not very rich, farmers, and so its difficult to conceive of how we 
would come up with more than that, plus so many of the problems are federal 
problems, to be honest, a lot of the construction stuff is what created the problems 
to begin with and I don’t think that’s fair, been really even acknowledged.” NFA 
 ”I am not sure how that was decided, I suspect it was just sort of a general 
regulation. I have no knowledge of whether its something that is done 75/25 
whether that’s just a matter of course for these kinds of things or whether that’s 
something special to this program.” NFA 
 “I guess that my answer to that would be that the feds might be paying for the 
lion’s share but the non-feds have the lion’s share to lose. If the program is a 
failure so…” FRA  
 
Some see this as fair as the origin of program costs are a federal law. However it is 
contended that non-federal actors have effectively claimed to be supporting 25% of total 
costs when their 25% contribution is for non-water, non-staff contributions.  
 “Let me tell you the truth about that…the truth of the matter is, Reclamation 
spends money on water, personnel and then Collaborative Program activities. And 
there is only a small proportion of the activities that’s actually cost shared 25%. 
So when you look at the over-all budget, and I think they actually had some read-
aheads when they, yeah I think its actually posted. But you can see the overall 
cost and how much the non-feds have contributed it’s a true cost share of about 
10%. So amongst recovery programs that’s very unusual. Congress will usually, 
they won’t authorize a recovery program that has that cheap of a deal… its very 
different, and its just, its just New Mexico politics that on the one hand they can 
pretend its 25%, but you have to say, 25% of the non-water and the non-people 
activities and reclamation spends most of its money on water and people.” FRA 
 
Senator Domenici’s role in Cost structuring stems from the passing the minnow rider, 
which made SJCP and Compact Credit water available for lease from willing sellers.  
 “The minnow rider, says that Reclamation, well it says that the secretary shall 
create a collaborative program and an Executive Committee and a Collaborative 
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Program and any water that needs to be acquired for the purposes of the 
Collaborative Program are paid for by Reclamation.” FRA 
 
Finally, is stated that even the portion actually paid by the non-federal partners (ISC 
is the largest non-federal contributor) is actually federal in origin. 
 “It isn’t an equitable distribution. I mean the feds pay 75% and the locals combine 
to pay 25% and whatever, that’s fine, but the only one that ever turns in any 
documentation that they actually need that 25% is the state of New Mexico and 
the state of New Mexico, all of the money spent on the collaborative program by 
the state of New Mexico including staff and on the ground projects comes from 
the federal government.  Because its either through grants through the 
Collaborative Program for habitat restoration projects, things like that, or through 
the money that Reclamation pays to the state of New Mexico for its relinquished 
compact credits. “ FRA 
 The costs for running the program, are in the main, coming out of federal 
agencies, its mostly Bureau funding, the Bureau gets the direct funding and then 
administers the Program. Then you know indirectly there’s quite a bit of funding 
or parallel cost from like the Army Corps, and then the non-fed side is supposedly 
cost sharing and the ISC used to carry a huge amount of the cost sharing. But they 
have said you know times being what they are at the state agency level they can’t 
be expected to continue to carry the ball for all the non federal agencies as far as 
cost share.” NFA 
 
Inefficiency on the part of the federal government is cited as equivalently 
unproductive. This appears to be an area where Senator Domenici was vital in steering 
the productivity of the Program. 
 
 “I kind of liked it when we were able to earmark that money that Domenici was 
able to appropriate for certain projects because you knew that’s what it was going 
to get used for.” NFA 
  “What can my agency do with $600,000 to make sure that funding, you know 
projects get on the ground, projects get placed- a lot! So I think part of it is that 
federal, you it just gets, it starts here and it just shrinks. And then in the end, when 
it finally gets funded, nobody even knows its been funded, nobody knows what its 
been funded for, nobody knows what direction its going, so there’s all these real 
issues that I don’t know how to fix, because I’ve been spending  years trying to 
fix it with Reclamation” NFA 
 “The CP did well for many years because of Senator Domenici’s direct 
intervention in federal funding procedures and apparatus. But now that’s gone. So 
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funding has gone down terrifically in the last couple of years since he’s been 
gone.” NFA 
6.4 Pressure Based Incentives 
6.4.1Incentive Building and Mutual Gains Based Incentives  
COV, INC 
 Coverage is a term that developed out of the interview process and was integrated 
into the Analytic Framework for the data analysis portion. It originally appeared as an 
answer to the question: “How satisfied is (partner) with the Program’s ability to develop 
mutually beneficial options or exchanges that allow more investment or buy-in from 
various non federal partners?” The basis of the question was found in Ury and Fischer 
(1981) and referred to the process outlined in Figure 2. The process enables negotiated 
solutions that become mutually beneficial and “expand the pie” from the kind of zero 
sum bargaining that often results in insufficient solutions and continued problems for the 
negotiators.  
 The original theme code used to describe this kind of behavior in the Analytic  
Framework was incentive building (INC). When the question was asked, it was often 
greeted with negative responses. Eventually the word coverage was used to describe the 
antithesis of incentive building negotiation, which was to use the Program as legal and 
financial coverage for status quo operations of various parties while contributing as little 
as possible. Using the direct answers to the question above and broader references to 
some form of coverage, responses were gathered to reflect multiple perspectives on the 
how these two themes interacted. They are both considered part of pressure-based 
incentives as one shows a level of sheltering necessity to a given party (Coverage). The 
other (Incentive Building) could mobilize pro-active behavior based more on mutual 
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benefit and buy-in to a common goal than necessity to shelter. The latter is considered to 
be more effective in problem solving. Responses included: 
 “There is certain momentum that gets developed that is good, but the real reason 
that everyone is there is to cover their own asses and people have a hard time 
moving off of that into a truly collaborative program.” FRA 
 “Because we have our own BO, you know we’re real worried about that, we don’t 
want that thing to blow up because you know we don’t want our BO reinitiated, 
that’s just not a good way to do things. That’s another reason why we participate 
in the CP is to protect our interest within our own BO.” NFA 
  “Mostly its coverage.” NFA 
 “Who needs coverage and how are they going to get it.” NFA 
 “I think as a collaboration we all can get protection that way.” NFA 
 Kind of referred to now as the big six. It was the big five and then NMAG started 
paying more attention to things....But see we are the ones that have resources and 
we have missions.” NFA 
 “Well first of all the ESA is a federal law so that subjection to the federal courts 
and all that stuff is not necessarily bad but that is the main concern.” NFA 
 “You know  the ESA consultation with the federal agencies, I mean they basically 
are the ones who have the primary responsibility for compliance with ESA and 
the move toward this RIP is partly to make it so that there is a more fairly 
distributed relationship there for compliance.” NFA 
 “They would basically like to use the RIP to protect their water uses, current 
water uses and contribute a little bit to recovery but they lack this commitment.” 
FRA 
 “Everybody is playing a game, trying to maintain what they, what rights and 
abilities they have, you know to serve their constituents and to meet these needs 
and collaborate and there is a balance on everybody’s part.” FRA 
 “I mean we have as agencies we have all managed to come together and come up 
with a way to just keep the thing limping along.” NFA 
 “I think a the hammer, I mean you either comply with the law or you don’t 
comply with the law. Hammer. I think you want to comply with the law, if you 
want to work together.” NFA 
 “I think everyone has an interest in protecting their interest, and everyone also has 
interest in complying with the law. So those are two of the couple of things that 
keeps people together.” NFA 
 “I would say probably not overall pleased.” NFA 
 “The chiefs have to sit down and you know kind of the heads have to talk so 
that’s good too.” NFA 
 “I think there’s a lot of resistance to moving forward and having some belief that 
some of the things were doing could do some good, there seems to be so much 
reluctance to actually do anything until we know its going to do good. So its more 
internal to the collaborative program that’s been the problem I think. “ NFA 
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 “Altruism? (Laugh) I think its risk management mostly, I think that’s what brings 
people to the table.” FRA 
 “I think its umm, probably not very satisfactory and its probably getting 
progressively less satisfactory, and sort of approaching, my personal perception of 
it is that the program is verging on kind of imploding” NFA 
 
One description cited benefits outside of coverage as more advantageous than 
collaborative: 
 “People come to the table to feed. There was not a single participant at the 
collaborative program who doesn’t get money out of the program. They get 
projects funded. I mean there was a period of time where the environmental 
groups, there were some environmental groups there for a while, participating in 
scopes of work development and getting the contracts. When reclamation dropped 
the hammer on appropriate contracting processes and avoiding the conflict of 
interest of having a contract recipient having engaged in drafting the scope of 
work, that they are then responding to, when they dropped the hammer on that, 
there are no environmentalists at the table any more.” NFA 
 
Over all, there appeared to be little in the way of collectively attempted expansion of 
options available. While the collaborative benefits mentioned earlier were able to bring 
together partners in cooperative work, most participants seemed dissatisfied, at least with 
the current levels of productive group behavior. 
6.4.2 Discount Rates and Voice 
DIS, VOI 
 
 Discount rate was an important factor as well in developing Pressure based 
incentives. “Skin in the Game” was referred to on a number of occasions to refer to a 
level of necessity. Various levels of need for coverage were described. In economic 
terms, farmers were considered by some to be the only entities with a direct connection 
between ESA compliance and their livelihoods. Agencies with little need for coverage or 
more limited interaction with species needs also pointed to the potential for variability in 
discount rate: 
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 “So everybody would have had to contribute if SJCP water was on the table and 
that, I mean how else to you get people at the table if they don’t have any skin at 
the game?” NFA 
 “ Its not that we haven’t really been willing or wanting to collaborate in this 
forum we just don’t have that much skin kin the game.” FRA 
 “Exposure for coverage, the need to be in the program for coverage is not a really 
extreme need.” NFA 
 “FWS, there only downside is that if the whole thing blows up, they might be 
accused of having caused it to blow up, but they don’t have water using 
constituents, so they can mandate that water be used and umm the agencies that 
control water can just be told.” NFA 
 “…who does not live within the benefitted area of the District.” NFA 
 “Cities are the junior users and vote to have this crap in here feel no pain from 
what they vote for.” NFA 
 “You know and its hard for to tell with the federal entities have better than an 
obligation to fulfill a regulatory requirement, check a box off.” NFA 
 “…when it’s a job that you walk away from at five o’clock and you checked off 
your box and there’s no real consequences.” NFA 
 “You know Jane Doe? Okay, I don’t know if you’ve spoken to her yet. I’m going 
to use her as an example, she represents, in my opinion kind of where the rubber 
meets the road. She’s a farmer, a dairy farmer, so her livelihood depends on the 
water and umm I appreciate the fact that she brings that to the table, because she 
is having to fight through all these federal regs in order to maintain her livelihood. 
She’s got to deal with the ESA, she’s got to deal with the State and all of the 
people that kind of have their hand on the spigot if you will and so yeah so she’s 
got to be clearly involved with what goes on with respect to the ESA because its 
her livelihood” FRA 
 
Voice (VOI) is a theme that signified an important “representational role.” For 
instance, a party with either limited or duplicated stake in Coverage, either for structural 
reasons or based on alliances with other entities, could be driven to participate by the 
need to have input on a given situation. In the next section these players will be described 
in terms of their subject positions to avoid confidentiality issues.  
 
6.5 Combined Subject Positions 
 
The results of coding analysis for this study point to some important incentive 
based elements experienced by the parties in collaboration. As stated by participants in 
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the previous sections, disparities exist between the need for coverage, control of 
resources and the reasons for being drawn to the program. These disparities divide 
Program participants and show differing orientations of stakeholders to the Program itself 
and various members’ participation in it. Coding took into account not only the Analytic 
Themes described in the previous four sections, but also their intersection with 
combinations of subject positions that characterized stakeholders.  
Subject positions applied to stakeholders were: 
FRA Federal Regulatory/Action Agency 
NFA Non-Federal Actor  
SNC Strong Need for Coverage 
WNC Weak Need for Coverage 
EXST – Has some exogenous/internal structural advantage 
RESources- Has resources, either water, land, monetary 
DUPlicative- Disadvantageous or secondary (less influential) dual 
representative 
  
These characterized stakeholders in seven subject position categories: 
1. FRA, SNC, RES, EXST 
2. NFA, SNC, RES, EXST 
3. NFA, WNC, RES, EXST 
4. NFA, SNC, RES 
5. NFA, SNC, DUP, RES 
6. NFA, DUP, EXST 
7. NFA, DUP, RES, EXST 
 
These subject position combinations and their intersecting relationships with 
incentive themes from previous sections is described in Table 2 below. Some interesting 
relationships are visible between various stakeholder orientations. The following quotes 
are labeled with the applicable subject position category. First, there are those 
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participants that made comments regarding “who has a rightful place at the table” based 
on resource control and “agency mission”: 
 “I think as a collaboration we all can get protection that way, but a, it’s like a, 
having negotiations, two party negotiations, but each and everyone has to give in 
something or work on something, sometimes we negotiate with a party who has 
got nothing.” 2 
 “Probably the trickiest issue is the Pueblos. How many pueblos do we have as 
signatories is it six, five? That’s a lot of members. That’s a lot of people that show 
up at meetings and have a vote in the process. Should they choose to have it, but, 
and the Pueblos have hard resources, okay? They have land along the RG, they 
use water from the river, they’re technically a stakeholder, but at the same time, 
the federal agencies have that federal trust obligation to look out for the Pueblo’s 
interests. Okay and so the factual result of that is in the program, the Pueblos are 
stakeholders, but they are looked out for by another stakeholder.” 2  
 “Okay Jane Doe, who we all know and love, okay she is a great voice, we like her 
in those meetings, but, along those same lines, the MRGCD is obligated to look 
out for the land and water resources of middle valley, water resources of 
irrigators, okay, so the MRGCD are already looking out for her interests. Why 
should she therefore be present at these meetings and participate in this process” 2 
 “There are too many groups in the program that don’t offer anything. I’ll just be 
blunt. But they can come to the EC and tie the works up. You know and that’s, I 
don’t think that’s right. I think you want to have stakeholders, but you want to 
have stakeholders that are able to help solve the problem and not just obfuscating 
the problem.” 2  
 “I generally think or we generally think its better to be as inclusive as we can but, 
if all you can contribute is occasional attendance at meetings, is that the 
equivalent weight of the FWS or Reclamation?” 2 
 “We feel that one individual farmer or one individual pueblo that can tie that up is 
probably not the best way to be collaborative.” 2 
 “For me the path forward is kick everybody out and just work with the Feds. They 
have got there responsibilities under the endangered species act so lets just work 
the system that way, the rest of this system is just a mess. These people wanting to 
poke around and cause problems and they don’t contribute anything.” 1 
 
Statements in this vein were not ubiquitous across these subject position categories (1 
and 2). In fact some participants within these categories strongly believed that the 
Program’s and their agency’s missions dictated a more inclusive role to play. What was 
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ubiquitously true for them however was that none mentioned the potential failure of the 
Program, that they directly considered viable legal options outside the Program, or that 
collaboration in this context was bound for failure as a means of recovering species and 
changing the status quo. 
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Table 2: Combined Subject Positions Intersection Matrix 
(Mobilizing Factor) FRA, SNC, RES, EXST NFA, SNC, RES, EXST 
NFA, WNC, RES, 
EXST NFA, SNC, RES 
Advantage related 
 Fed. Law Relations, Minnow 
Rider, Op. Authorities, Coverage 
Separate BO, Minnow Rider, Op. 
Authorities, Water, Economic, Coverage 
Limited Need for 
Coverage, Op. 
Authorities 
Resources, Op. Authorities, 
Coverage 
Program related Coverage, Political Relations, 
Facilitative Coverage, Political Relations 
Representation in 
Process, Facilitative 
Representation in Process, 
Facilitative 
Power related 
Control of Trajectory, Outcomes Control of Trajectory, Outcomes 
Control of Trajectory, 
Outcomes 
Control of Trajectory, 
Outcomes 
Relationship related 
Political, Collaborative, Trust Political, Collaborative, Preservative 
Political, Collaborative, 
Preservative 
Political, Collaborative, 
Preservative 
Cost related 
Distributive, Facilitative Preservative, Conservative  
Preservative, 
Conservative  
Preservative, Conservative, 
Facilitative, Distributive 
Preservative 
Env., Budgetary, Political, Legal 
Resource, Budgetary, Status Quo, 
Tradition, Municipal, Legal 
Budgetary, Env. 
Municipal, Legal Budgetary, Legal, Resource 
Incentive Building 
related 
Political, Collaborative, Trust Collaborative, Preservative 
Collaborative, 
Restoration Oriented 
Collaborative, Restoration 
Oriented, Preservative 
Collaboration related 
Political, Integral Interdependence Mutual Benefit, Preservative 
Mutual Benefit, 
Representational Mutual Benefit, Preservative 
Social concern 
Integral Interdependence 
Preserv., Conserv., Municipal, 
Traditional, Economic  Municipal 
Preservative, Legal, 
Traditional 
Environmental 
concern 
Primary to mission under ESA Heavily Influences Mission Municipal, Social 
Preservative, Legal, Social, 
Proactive 
Representation 
related 
Meeting, Enforcing Compliance, 
Coverage Coverage under ESA, Legal Administrative Administrative, Legal 
Coverage related 
Mandatory Legal 
Limited, 
Representational Legal, Preservative 
Discount rate related 
Mandatory Legal 
Municipal, 
Representational Legal, Representational 
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(Mobilizing Factor) NFA, SNC, DUP, RES NFA, DUP, EXST NFA, DUP, RES, EXST 
Advantage related 
State Water Rights Fed. Law Relations Fed. Law Relations 
Program related 
Representation in Process Representation in Process, Facilitative Representation in Process 
Power related 
Control of Trajectory, Outcomes Control of Trajectory, Outcomes Control of Trajectory, Outcomes 
Relationship related Political, Collaborative, Preservative Political, Collaborative, Preservative Political, Collaborative, Preservative 
Cost related 
Preservative, Conservative  Conservative Preservative, Conservative  
Preservative 
Resource, Tradition, Legal Env., Budgetary, Legal Resource, Budgetary, Legal 
Incentive Building 
related Collaborative, Preservative Altering Status Quo Collaborative, preservative 
Collaboration related 
Mutual Benefit, Preservative Env.  Mutual Benefit, Preservative 
Social concern 
Preservative, Traditional, Economic Env., Altering Status Quo Preservative, Traditional, Economic 
Environmental concern 
Legal, Preservative, Traditional Primary to Mission Traditional 
Representation related Traditional, Economic, Preservative, 
Legal Env., Legal Traditional, Economic, Preservative, Env., Legal 
Coverage related 
Legal, Preservative, Traditional Limited, Representational Legal, Preservative, Traditional 
Discount rate related 
End User, Critical Economic Environmental, Representational Traditional, Representational, Legal 
  
 
85 
Statements made in regard to program failure or possible non-collaborative options 
led to interest in another phenomenon operating in the Program, that of duplicate roles as 
identified in categories 5,6 and 7. Each of these players occupied or could occupy an 
alliance with a (politically, financially, or in terms of resource control) stronger 
stakeholder. Where there was strong disagreement over how a particular constituency or 
position should be represented, the alliance was either wary or openly adversarial. Where 
the alliance was not adversarial, it had the potential to be symbiotic in terms of combined 
voting power. These relationships could possibly vary on an issue to issue basis. Another 
category existed in which overall need for coverage was minimal and in certain legal 
scenarios, exposure would be increased by participation in the Program. Combined, these 
categories’ participants held some of the strongest criticisms of the Program and their 
participants spoke in terms of viable alternatives to collaboration. These stakeholders 
were commonly those that expressed a program related concern that was representative 
(Voice) which more effectively defined their roles.  
Importantly, these entities for which the Collaborative Program was questionable, had 
one or another system of “Rule of Law” regulatory structures: either environmental, prior 
appropriation, or federal trust authorities to fall back on in litigation. This places the 
MRGESCP squarely in the dilemma expressed by Karkainnen (2002, 2008) and others in 
chapter 3.3 of this study.   
6.6 Adaptive Management/Scientific Legitimacy 
 
In 2009 the program adopted AM as the means by which it would conduct the 
RIP science program. A contracted entity performed the design and development of the 
program’s AM Plan Version One as a template for a Version Two to be completed by the 
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program signatories at a later date (MRGESCP 2011). There is a conflict within the 
program over validity of science, availability and propriety of data and generally, from 
participant responses, a lack of clear understanding of what species really need.  
 “I think the program really has to look at reality. And I don’t think so many of 
those people are looking at reality, they are just looking at what the biology of the 
fish needs, but there are no reality, is it all what we need is available or not, so 
program has to look at those realities first. You may think that this is what the 
needs are but hydrologically or any, the way may not be possible but we have to 
find other solutions by which it could survive through those critical times.” NFA 
 “That’s true so ten years, ten years ESA process, spend 100 million dollars and 
still we are not anyplace.” NFA  
 “The issue of the fish biology is I think worth considering too, I think the low spot 
appeared to be around 2002-3. But the Question that I have always had is: is that 
really the low spot? Because monitoring only goes back for a relatively short 
period of time and there is this kind of implicit assumption in FWS and a lot of 
the ESA arguments that the population was always here. Okay and we started 
looking at the population and its actually down here and its working its way down 
a little bit lower but there...There is no baseline. My personal opinion on it, being 
a non-biologist is just and opinion, it doesn’t have any weight is that population 
probably tends to do this naturally over time.” NFA 
 “I actually think the species is not necessarily endangered in the middle Rio 
Grande right now, any more than it was thirty years ago or forty years ago.” NFA 
 “There is no science behind the 2003 BO. It appeared literally over night.” NFA 
 “And they maintained incredibly high flows because they didn’t know what a 
desert species was and they treated everything like it was a cold water trout.” 
NFA 
 “If you talk to some of the folks there about Dan Goodman, I think he was the 
first time that we’ve had any kind of scientific credibility in the program.” NFA 
  “I think because a lot of people complain that what the service has been 
mandating is draconian and not based on sound science.” FRA 
 
AM is considered by all participants to be the mechanical “step in the right 
direction” that the program needs to achieve clarity of science and decision protocol. This 
is conditional “if” it is implemented correctly. This “if” leads the program into another 
problem area. While each participant answered that it was certainly a good idea and 
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useful paradigm from which to manage, nearly all participants felt that success was likely 
dependent on the way it was implemented.  
 “I think AM will be the saving grace of this program if it can be employed 
properly. Everyone is talking about it right now. No one in my opinion has 
actually employed it here.” NFA 
 “When it is implemented and becomes part of the culture, you know we’ve paid 
for several meetings and a report to try and get to AM. So now the funding for 
that has kind of gone away so we will try and do a lot of this ourselves. AM is 
important, because if you can set down a set of scientific questions that you need 
to answer, to recover the fish then you can implement them and monitor them and 
change as necessary and once something works or doesn’t you can get it out of 
the program.” NFA 
 “AM in General has got to be the answer for the RIP, we have to be able to 
change our ways of management depending on what the climatic situation is as 
well as you know what we have learned with the fish or you know what we’ve 
done differently among water management.” NFA 
 “I think its much more effective if we are doing AM in habitat restoration or 
monitoring. But at this point it looks like the only form of AM that we are 
actually trying to initiate are like “how do we run meetings?” And I think you 
could just go to some sort of meeting management school to learn how to do that. 
So to me that really doesn’t qualify as AM. They call it that but, they call it that.” 
NFA 
 “Done correctly and embraced it is the absolutely the only salvation in my 
opinion.” NFA 
 “I just think it’s a step in the right direction, I don’t think it solves anything but I 
think that having a formal role for the scientific process just has to be helpful.” 
FRA 
 “Absolutely, I think that AM would get us to hopefully a place where people 
agree more on what the fish needs.” FRA 
 “It will definitely be, problem is how do you do it?” FRA 
 
Some believed that it would not be possible to attain the level of methodical AM 
implementation discussed in literature.  
 “I think that there are a lot of different views of adaptive management and I think 
that you know, my view of the strict, must hypothesis test everything, is not 
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where we are probably going to be able to go because we are not going to have 
the money to conduct a lot of, and I don’t even know how to set up a lot of those 
hypothesis testing because.” NFA 
Some believed that the way the federal government applies AM is insufficient. Many 
made some statement about its success being dependent on what “they” believe AM is -
alluding to suspicion about how politics could affect implementation.  Indeed, by the end 
of the data collection process, participants were being asked to define AM. Most federal 
and some non-federal participants gave a similar definition to that applied in the literature 
review of this study. Some however, even if it appeared that they knew that definition, 
defined it as reactive adaptation. Other participants freely admitted that they were not 
confident everyone was on the same page. Entities with more or less confidence in the 
program stated that AM was likely to manifest as influenced by the core power struggles 
and politics of the program whether or not it was a useful paradigm. Obviously the 
prospect of AM will have its challenges as it proceeds. 
 “Well, you have to understand what adaptive management means to each and 
every one of them, they all think different things, to me it means different things, 
to the federal government its different too?” NFA 
 “To us it means we adapt to the new environment, new resources, new processes. 
That’s what adaptive management means.” NFA 
 “AM is a very methodical structured process of hypotheses analysis and testing. 
Its very deliberate and measured and I continue to see people in the CP treating it 
rather superficially, just tossing it out as kind of this “oh we’re just going to do 
AM” and a lot of the people I think toss that out and most of the people that here 
it think its well you try one thing and if it doesn’t work you try something else.” 
NFA 
 “The program, the EC has committed to AM and exactly how that may look and 
exactly what might be the results from that I don’t know.” NFA 
 “All adaptive management really means in my opinion is having the flexibility to 
adapt to the existing conditions.” NFA 
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 “Sounds good on paper. In practice, I think the way it gets implemented by 
federal agencies is let us be adaptive, its juxtaposed to prescriptive management 
and I think AM that has as its cornerstone, prescriptions is fine.” NFA 
 “There’s no accountability frankly, because the adaptation is not to new science, 
the adaptation is to the political and economic forces.” NFA 
 “I mean because in the past people have said the minnow, you know they just 
burrow in the sand and they can live in the sand (laugh) and its not like that. 
That’s not true. They need water.” FRA 
 “To me you know we all adaptively manage every day in our lives, you know you 
try something, it doesn’t work, you try something else.” FRA  
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7. Discussion 
 
 The origins of the program do begin with something like Karkainnen’s (2008) 
destabilization events. Initially, the listing of the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow and 
Southwestern Willow Flycatcher brought federal and state agencies to the table with 
water appropriators to develop solutions to species problems. Environmental groups took 
their lead in developing more ambitious strategies and the two groups met for over a year 
in collaborative development of solutions. “Things got more serious” when the 
environmental groups sued the Reclamation for failure to consult under Section 7” 
(NFA). Litigation brought by water users contesting the Reclamation’s ability to take 
SJCP water to supplement environmental flows increased tensions and some saw the 
need to attend the issues in another way. Senator Domenici stepped in to draft the rider 
that would require the collaborative program’s inception.  
 The existence of the superordinate goal is obvious in some participants’ 
enthusiastic recollections of the initial mood under Senator Domenici’s involvement. 
“Yeah we can get this done in ten years and the whole edict was, Senator Domenici was 
like we are going to get this problem solved in ten years damn it and move on” (NFA). 
But, the 2003 BO made participation in the program the requisite (among more specific 
activities under the RPAs) for coverage under the ESA and the Senator’s rider itself 
removed some very important components of structural pressure on participants to 
collaborate effectively. First, negating the court decision that Reclamation had legal right 
to divert SJC water from contracted recipients to endangered species did several things. 
(1) It changed the dynamics of cost share moving more of the burden to the federal side. 
(2) It removed a resource that some participants felt offered the only parity between 
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agricultural and municipal water interests in that both had stake in that particular 
project’s water. Making SJCP water a monetary advantage increased the Water Utility’s 
advantage over the MRGCD’s and its constituents’ because native6 Rio Grande water 
was not stipulated to be available on a willing seller basis and the MRGCD gets much 
less of the SJCP than the ABCWUA. While the MRGCD is shown to have its own means 
of deflecting responsibility in Chapter 6.3.2, water rights holders view SJCP water’s “off 
the table” status as unfair and dangerous to the future of agriculture itself in the MRG. 
The MRGCD is said to deliver water for species needs and for Bosque del Apache 
National Wildlife Preserve without legally mandated consideration of prior appropriation. 
This is even more complex in light of the fact that the MRG is unadjudicated. This is the 
origin of conflict over MRGCD’s record keeping as native Rio Grande water rights are 
owned by assessment paying irrigators.  
Second, the rider sheltered federal action agencies from litigation. Sheltering 
factors are said to be culpable in a lack of real solutions and creative thinking coming out 
of the long term process as well as specific infractions such as the failure to complete fish 
passage by the 2008 deadline under the 2003 BO. 
While these interventions are the kind of protections that might have been seen as 
necessary for buy-in so that collaboration could initiate, in the long run all of these 
sheltering alterations have reduced the level of pressure and thus incentive for individuals 
to actively and dynamically seek solutions. Finally, it is said that restructuring the 
program to emphasize the importance of parties with hard resources in negotiation 
“hardened” the program into a “more federal-like bureaucracy” (NFA). It is said that the 
                                                          
6
 Native in this context refers to water and rights to that water that are of and originate in the Rio Grande 
Basin as opposed to water from trans-basin diversions such as the SJCP. 
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Senator’s office was convinced that the more-diffuse collaboration of the early days was 
spending too much money and was not able to generate the results needed in a timely 
manner. While a logical conclusion, some parties feel that this emphasized a split 
between certain kinds of stakeholders and is one responsible factor in the conspicuous 
lack of ENGO’s at the collaborative table.  
David Freeman (2010) signifies the need for periods of “regulatory cruising” 
where stakeholders are able to stave off commitment of hard resources for long enough 
periods to create coalitions that equalize or elevate incentive to participate among parties 
who may not have incentive but could de-rail Program progress. It appears that in the 
MRGESCP, this has been complicated by the reduction in pressure mechanisms that 
would eventually force various groups to “pony up” resources. It has not been possible to 
secure the support of ENGO’s and some trust relationships among non-federal actors 
within the program are very much on a verification basis. Some if these dynamics were 
described as potentially inducing program failure. 
 In terms of how the group has generated institutional supply, Ostrom’s questions 
for evaluation of institutional supply reveal important elements of the investment 
capabilities of the MRGESCP. As to how many players are involved, there are sixteen 
program signatories at the time of this writing. While this is not a terribly unwieldy 
number, there is debate as to how many should be involved and this debate seems to stem 
from the power disparities established above and has much to do with internal group 
structure. Most players exist somewhere within a hierarchy of authority, capacity and 
political advantage with variable discount rates, sheltering advantages and need for 
coverage. While some clusters of signatories can be made based on similar hierarchical 
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levels there is little in the way of equality that can be drawn across the entire table. More 
logical than seeking to evaluate equality within the MRGESCP, is to take a look at what 
is actually still a top-down governance structure in a state somewhere on the way to being 
a forum for equality. The focus of inquiry should then rest on nested symbiotic, quasi- 
parasitic or adversarial/ alliance relationships between partners and to the program itself.  
This inquiry can be accomplished with another of Ostrom’s questions, who 
initiated the process? Or importantly in this case what? The ESA and its implementing 
agency are the initial impetus for the existence of this program by way of litigation 
generated and the intervention of powers at the congressional level. If we ask who paid 
costs of entrepreneurial activities? We begin to see how these relationships interact. It is 
said that the Bureau of Reclamation carried the weight of the federal 75% of the cost 
share. The ISC supplied most of the 25% of the non-federal cost share but reportedly 
makes a portion, be it large or small of that from Reclamation to begin with. Coupled 
with the stated reality that cost share refers to Program activities (non-water, non-people) 
while the dominant spending categories are water and staff, the non-federal cost share, by 
a separate account is around 10%. The accuracy of those statements is certainly disposed 
to disagreement but, by and large, the top-down nature of the authority hierarchy is 
mirrored by the top down nature of the funding structure. Because this is an arrangement 
structured as a zero-sum bargaining forum, the object of the regulated parties, as stated 
above by a non-federal collaborator is to shift as much of the burden as is possible onto 
the federal tax payer. These factors produce allegiances with duplicative voices in 
symbiotic cycles of support such as the participant-described relationship between the 
Bureau of Reclamation with its Tribal Trust obligations and Pueblos who reportedly tend 
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to favor Reclamation’s positions. It produces adversarial or wary alliances where 
duplicative voices disagree about the fate of a commonly represented resource such as 
that of the APA and MRGCD. Finally, it creates a general atmosphere of quasi-parasitism 
as regulated parties vie for regulatory shelter and economic support for their activities 
while producing the least possible contribution instead of all parties laying down their 
cards to attempt the productive problem solving that would heal the problems that 
enlisted them to begin with. 
To answer what kind of information do participants have about situation?: 
information is a key issue when it comes to disputes about science and data management 
especially in regard to who controls the science. It is a contentious issue within a number 
of ESA based collaborations beside the MRGESCP that the regulatory body also 
produces the science by which regulated actions are evaluated. But as Freeman (1997) 
suggests in Chapter 4 of this study it is the same top-down, zero sum structure that 
inhibits the regulatory agency from rescinding control of that position. 
Information also comes to play in regard to risks and exposures experienced by 
the parties involved. The legacy of state and federal interaction in control of water 
resources manifests here with regard to the MRG in the title dispute between 
Reclamation and the MRGCD. It also influences the strong distrust between FWS and the 
ISC and New Mexico Attorney General. Each side would tend, in the absence of 
collaborative benefits described in Chapter 6, to protect itself with dispensation of as little 
information as possible. If FWS becomes completely transparent with its scientific 
procedures and data, it risks being accused of ulterior objectives. If the MRGCD begins 
to accurately account for its water dispersal for species needs, it will open itself to 
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litigation from farmers though, on the MRG, their recourse through state adjudications to 
enforce prior appropriation may be limited by the absence of such adjudication on the 
MRG.  
Highly important in regard to risks and exposures is the dominating incentive of 
coverage pursued in various ways by partners in positions of influence to maintain a 
status quo in their operations upset by the ESA. 
 The MRGESCP has both benefitted from and is systemically hindered by external 
institutions. In benefits, the species of the MRG have a mechanism for protection in the 
ESA. Appropriators have an opposing but similarly protective mechanism in state law. 
The program receives funding from federal sources and received leadership and direction 
from congress when Senator Domenici was involved. In hindrances, the same protections 
are divisive and, the guiding hand of congress appeared to, in short-sightedness relieve 
the program of some of its mechanisms for investment mobilization. It did so under bias 
that redistributed risk and incentive in unproductive ways.  
 Possibly more importantly is the structure of responsibility under the ESA. First, 
the ESA has regulatory “teeth” to attack only a narrow slice of the problem at hand with 
the endangered species of the MRG. First and foremost it only attends to continued 
involvement of federal agencies in actions that jeopardize endangered species
7
. On the 
MRG, this results in a reduction of the ESA’s scope of influence to water management. 
This is necessary, but ignores the fact that the habitat modifications that have endangered 
the species to begin with are the result of activities that no longer have any federal 
involvement. The building of Cochiti dam or improvement of diversion structures and 
                                                          
7
 Since non-federal actors are included in Section Seven consultations on the MRG, “take” under Section 9 
is omitted from this discussion. 
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works and river channelization are all tasks that were completed long before the listing of 
the species. This sets stakeholders to a dynamic of denying responsibility for making 
fixes to those parts of the river that are geomorphologically altered by a century of 
completed engineering while asserting the ecological benefits of their water use regimes. 
These benefits include the existence of extra water in the stream from the SJC project, or 
various return flow contributions made by agricultural uses.  
 Second, in relation to scope, the ESA focuses on the MRG because of the 
existence of minnow populations there and only there at the time of its listing. While 
there are experimental populations in two other parts of the Rio Grande system in Texas 
and on the Pecos River, they are small in area. Thus the focus for species recovery is 
confined to around 5% of its original range. The effect on species throughout the Rio 
Grande system is the affect of the reduction of habitat in specific locations. In terms of a 
species ability to sustain indefinitely however, the “whole” of these habitats in specific 
locations is more than “the sum of its parts.” For millennia of unencumbered dynamics 
on the Rio Grande, genetic viability of these species was the product of their entire range. 
Focusing on the 5% of this range that the MRG constitutes is one of the factors that led 
some participants to characterize the minnow as a “conservation-reliant species” now and 
for as long as the river is managed for human uses on their current scale. Conservation 
reliance refers to the need for a species to be continually managed through human 
interventions. This is the case when a species’ habitat has been or will be drastically 
modified to the extent that recovery without continued intervention for an indefinite 
period is unlikely (Scott et al. 2005). 
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 As described in Chapter 6, the MRGESCP contains two important dynamics that 
influence the Program’s potential success and fit it squarely in the context of the 
collaboration versus “Rule of Law” dilemma. (1) The same conflict between resource 
extraction and biological diversity that fueled the 1970s legislative trend away from 
“interest group liberalism” and the formation of a rigid regulatory structure and culture is 
active in the MRGESCP. ENGO participants cited, almost verbatim, the concerns 
outlined by authors in Chapter 4. These groups are currently not a part of collaboration 
and the Program’s tendencies as influenced by larger stakeholders have not convinced 
ENGOs that their thinking is incorrect. (2) Disparities in influence where duplicate 
representatives disagree with the more influential stakeholders about program trajectory 
are grounds for dissent. In the worst case, dissenting entities have legal options that 
threaten the program. This seems to require that the Program do what it can to alleviate 
dissenters’ concerns. While many more influential entities cited the ideal that only those 
with “resources and missions” should participate in the collaboration, they neglect the 
reality that the resource held by dissenters is legal recourse and their missions may be 
rooted in very different discount rates concerning livelihood and biological health of 
systems that resource appropriators depend on. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
 The Collaborative Program, for its complexity and problems, still exists in a state 
where progress is highly possible. This study has framed the concept of stakeholders to 
the Program to include entities not currently signatories to the process. This is because 
they are included in a group of dissenters and possible dissenters within the Program that 
have expressed grave concern for their position or for the Program. This concern is based 
on a divide over disparities in influence within the collaborative forum and can be seen 
on both sides of the social verses environmental interest divide. The problem for 
investment of institutional supply within the program is based on a mischaracterization of 
resources and missions as only those with value to specific entities.  Because the divide 
could bring about litigation that threatens the Program’s longevity, the situation fits 
squarely within the dilemma of “rule of law” verses collaboration.  If it is a given truth 
among Program participants that the solutions that can be reached by collaboration are 
better than those that can be reached in another fashion, these issues of disparity in the 
MRGESCP should be attended.  
Any solution to this problem contends with major structural difficulties. “We’ve 
got this single thread system, it’s a zero sum game. Any water that goes through the 
ecosystem environment has to come from some other use right? So there are really 
limited options, you know a lot of systems, like systems on the west coast where there’s 
multiple tributaries and they all have dams and reservoirs. You can do this various 
trading and you know nobody really has to sacrifice as much as they do here to meet 
those species needs but here, if there is going to be water in the river all the time for the 
species, somebody is giving it up” (FRA).   
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 The Program is attempting to implement tools that are novel and still unproven in 
terms of long-term benefit. Collaboration, as described above is wrought with the 
dilemma of how far to move away from the system of rigid, prescriptive law that 
guarantees certain protections, but utterly fails to attend to the scope and complexity of 
environmental and social realities.  
 Adaptive management suffers from a lack of regulatory buttressing and as 
demonstrated in this process is hindered by politics, lack of understanding and possibly 
most important, the necessity of long term funding. Neither tool, however, can be said to 
be falsely applied in the MRGESCP. The problems posed for either tool by the 
MRGESCP are the problems posed for these tools generally. Whether or not the Program 
will become a RIP and survive this period of growing pains may be another question. 
Here it may manifest that these “new age” tools did not fit the specific circumstances of 
the situation and time. The problem then is how to solve the problems that the Program 
was conceived to attend to. According to participants, these tools are still the best option 
they can think of for the collection of interests at stake. 
It was stated by one federal partner representative and one regulated partner 
representative that morale has suffered due to the amount of time and money put in to 
developing the program and saving the minnow, only to find that a decade later the 
minnow continues to suffer and the program is just as compromised as ever. It should be 
noted here that the program on the Platte River, which has now become the model for the 
MRGESCP (in its currently functioning state) is the product of litigation that originated 
in the 1970’s. The program itself evolved out of relicensing problems that appeared in the 
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mid-1990’s and the first MOA leading to what became the Platte River Recovery 
Implementation Program in 2008 was signed in 1997.  
Since 2008 that program has had the opportunity to develop itself in functional 
form, in an adaptive science program with agreed rules, sufficient protections and a long 
history of collaboration of the parties involved. By the end of the first increment of the 
Platte River RIP, the endangered species issues on the river will be nearly 50 years old. In 
phases of its evolution that more resemble what the MRGESCP is going through now, it 
has been heavily, legally criticized and suffered from loss of environmental 
representation and numerous in-fights among resource appropriators who stood to lose by 
other representatives’ ideas or actions. While the Platte will certainly have its challenges, 
its state is far different from that members of the MRGESCP encounter within their own 
program. But the point is that members of the MRGESCP should not expect at this time, 
that their problems’ solutions will be expedited. It should also be noted, as some of its 
members have, that the species, social and political issues on the MRG are arguably more 
complex than those on the Platte. There should be an expectation that this will be a much 
longer, more expensive journey than it has already been.  
It may also be time to realize that the only way to achieve something similar is to 
not only persist, but to alter the game from the current zero-sum, “shell game” it has 
become. Protections must be put in place on a conditional basis that protect the 
collaboration and not specific parties’ interests while somehow recognizing each of these 
interests as every program member’s personal goal. This may be the point at which the 
comments on leadership are most important. If the influential partners to the program are 
caught in a cycle of reinforcing their status quo operations, it may take substantially 
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charismatic leadership with some authority to enforce change upon these parties. On the 
Platte, protective guarantees took the form of ESA coverage for AM in the first 13- year 
increment, sheltering parties from sanction for specific hazards to species if they were 
effective through the AM mechanism in altering the circumstances that caused them 
(Freeman 2010).  
Of interest in the interview process, was the strained buy-in exhibited about the 
various elements of proceeding to become a RIP. Participants seemed unsure of what lay 
ahead. The program has committed to follow the model of the Platte River RIP. It was 
noted in this study that multiple participants had David Freeman’s book, “Implementing 
the Endangered Species Act on the Platte River Water Commons” on their shelves. Most 
notably was the fact that few participants had been able to read it. The book is a major 
contribution to this study and provides a comprehensive history of ten years of Program 
related negotiation. While this study finds some disagreement with Freeman’s 
conclusions, many of which are un-tested in terms their actual success on the ground, it 
could be an invaluable tool to participants of the MRGESCP in developing the 
institutions at least by which to agree on process. 
Finally, Even if the species are to remain conservation reliant, the need for river 
managers to learn how to manage “outside the box” is imminent. Already, the simple 
problem of water allocation is compounded by climate change. The principles in Bates 
(1988) and Ostrom (1990) in which soft communications enable reciprocal actions that 
allow institutional change must be implemented as they can be among the MRG players. 
Multiple suggestions are made by interview participants. In the words of one participant: 
“Let’s do some things that are just good water management planning, even if there was 
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no endangered species here because we’ve got climate change, we’ve got drought, we’ve 
got things we’ve got to prepare for. Let’s develop flexibilities in our reservoir operations 
and let’s make sure that we can store any type of water in any of those reservoirs and we 
enhance the capacity as much as we can and then downstream, looking at the river below 
the San Acacia Reach, that river is perched. It’s up above the groundwater. Connect that 
thing, then we’ll use less water. There are things that people could be doing. But right 
now everybody’s just focused on what’s the structure going to be?” The point is that 
activity will enhance the ability of parties to contribute, if that activity is productive. 
Parties can invest and test, because only with maximum buy-in will collaboration be safer 
and the scope of real problems be attended.  
The MRGESCP suffers from trust issues arising out of individual actions. But 
those individual actions are deeply affected and arguably required under the status quo 
elaborated in the discussion. Fault, while easily assigned based on simplistic precepts of 
honesty, is as much a structural, strategic issue as a personality issue. Remedies to 
individual personalities can only be attempted through buy-in of a core of constituents 
united against dishonesty. This core buy-in is hindered by the protective nature of parties 
in zero-sum negotiation. Altering the status quo greatly reduces the potential for its 
existence. This may have to be done in “out of the box”, “what if there were no 
endangered species” ways as described above. 
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9. Limitations and Further Research 
 
 This research was limited predominantly by time. The shear number of facts to be 
understood and the haphazard nature by which they were acquired or understood as 
interviews proceeded greatly hindered the research process. If this were to be conducted 
again, a much more comprehensive study of meeting minutes for several years, or 
meeting attendance for a longer period would be advisable. Many other meetings of the 
Program took place during this research, the Executive Committee meetings observed for 
this project were likely not representative of dynamics to be found in smaller breakouts of 
stakeholder groups. Finally, some stakeholders, due to time, limited contact with the 
researcher (trust), or other variables caused some perspectives to remain unaccounted for. 
It would be a goal of a repeated study to attend to as many perspectives as possible. 
Analyzing mobilization of participation in ESA-driven collaboration in this way 
would optimally be done in regard to a number of other similar programs. The scope of a 
master’s thesis is too narrow to produce a comprehensive review of multiple program 
histories, the regulatory and political climates in which they evolved, the variability in 
structure based on management, stakeholders, and species issues and numerous other 
components of ESA driven collaborative programs. Because of the interest and 
prevalence of collaborative processes in many scenarios it seems a relevant topic. This is 
especially true in Western water management, where these processes are overlaid with a 
rigid set of “rule of law” regulations that so constrain available avenues. A book length, 
comparative study of institutional supply mobilization in various programs would be 
appealing as a means of understanding similarities and disparities among the programs. 
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11. Appendices 
Appendix A: Analytical Framework, Interview Instrument and Final Codebook 
Analytical Framework and Interview Questions 
 
Q1. Interests: a) What is the mission of (Partner)? b)What has been the role of 
(partner) in the MRGESCP c) Is partner satisfied with this role? 
Q2. How satisfied is (partner) with the program’s ability to develop mutually 
beneficial exchanges/ options for the various partners? 
Q3. How likely is it that all three of the MRGESCP’s stated goals can be 
accomplished? 
Q4. Are stakeholders equally burdened by the need for compliance? How has 
buy-in been achieved? 
Q5. Does (partner) feel secure in trust relationships with other partners? How 
has trust been achieved? 
Q6. Is the distribution of cost for the program activities fair? How was 
provision of cost decided? 
Q7. Is adaptive management/ transitioning to a RIP beneficial to (partner)? 
Why? 
 
 
 
Investment Mobilizing: 
Interest Based 
MI Environmental- including incentives that concern biodiversity, 
intrinsic value of the river system or species, or preparing the MRG 
ecosystem for bleak climate forecast. This is mobilizing depending on 
stakeholder orientation to the goals of ESA and or resilience based 
stewardship (Sax 2001,Chapin 2009, Craig 2009). Q1. 
 MI Social- including incentives that concern the longevity of the MRG 
economy, traditional life-ways, camaraderie of entities involved in 
decision making (Chapin 2009, Fisher and Brown 1988). Q1. 
Relationship based 
 MR Collaborative- such that would-be adversarial interest-based goals 
and cooperative interest-based goals are simultaneously reached (Fisher 
and Ury 1981). Q2. 
 MR Program related concern (Proactive)-such as the ability of the 
program partners to enhance relationships, to survive and function 
proactively toward the three stated goals of the MRGESCP or find 
replacements that offer some more feasible evolutionary state of the 
program or alternative (Fisher and Ury 1981). Q3. 
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Pressure Based 
 MP Incentive Building- Inventing for mutual gains, expanding available 
options, cost share options (Ury and Fisher 1981) Q2. 
 MP Coverage- Expansion or contraction of flexibility, discretion, need for 
coverage such that pressure increases/decreases (Doremus 2001, Freeman 
2010) Q4. 
 MP Cost apportionment- Engineering of fair shares to increase pressure 
(Freeman 2010) Q6. 
 
Investment Hindering: 
  
Interest Based 
 HI Preservative (Protection) of a status-quo interest such as water supply, 
tradition such as agrarian or indigenous life-ways, or defense of some 
level of bargaining advantage (Freeman 2010). Q1. 
 HI Advantageous such as economic gain, infrastructure 
maintenance/improvement, political gain, shelter from some form of 
individual sanction under the Endangered Species Act (Freeman 2010, 
Ostrom 1990). Q1. 
 HI Program related concern (Status Quo) such as the ability of the 
program to survive and function less effectively toward program goals but 
in preservation of a given partner’s interest (Ostrom 1990). Q1. 
Relationship based 
 HR Power dynamics- Dynamics are such that one or multiple groups’ 
resources and incentives make collaboration less likely for other partners 
(Freeman 2010) Q4. 
 HR Trust- Compromise between parties is hampered by damaged trust in 
relationships (Poitras et al. 2003) Q5. 
Pressure Based 
 HR Cabining/Expanding of Agency Discretion in ESA administration- 
Expansion or contraction of flexibility such that pressure increases/ 
decreases (Doremus 2001). Q4. 
 HR Cost apportionment- Engineering of fair shares to relieve pressure 
(Freeman 2010) Q6. 
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Final Codebook 
Logistical 
Observation 
Interview 
Document 
Subject Position 
FRA Federal Regulatory/Action Agency 
NFA Non-Federal Actor  
SNC Strong Need for Coverage 
WNC Weak Need for Coverage 
EXST – Has some exogenous/structural advantage 
RESources- Has resources, either water, land, monetary 
DUPlicative- Disadvantageous, secondary 
Analytical (Incentives/disincentives) 
 ADVantageous 
PROgram related (supportive/unsupportive) 
POWer dynamics 
RELationships (trust/structural) 
COSt related (individual/programmatic) 
PREServative (economic, tradition, status quo) 
INCentive building (mutual benefit, exchange) 
COLlaboration  
SOCial 
ENVironmental 
VOIce (group representation) 
COVerage 
DIScount rate (Skin in game) 
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Appendix B: Index of Acronyms Used 
 
 
AM Adaptive Management…………………………………………………………. 20 
APA Assessment Payers' Association of the MRGCD……………………………… 17 
BO Biological Opinion…………………………………………………………..… 8 
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality……………………………………………. 9 
CPR Common Pool Resource………………………………………………………. 18 
CWA Clean Water Act………………………………………………………………. 8 
EC Executive Committee………………………………………………………..… 6 
ENGO Environmental Non-Governmental Organization……………………………... 2 
EPA EnvironmentalProtection Agency……………………………………………… 9 
ESA Endangered Species Act……………………………….………………………. 7 
FWS United States Fish and Wildlife Service………………………………..……… 7 
ISC New Mexico Interstate Stream Commission……………………………...…… 17 
kaf thousand acre-feet……………………………………………………………… 13 
MRG Middle Rio Grande……………………….……………………………………. 4 
MRGCD Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District……………………………………... 5 
MRGESCP Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program……………... 1 
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act…………………………………………… 9 
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service…………………………………………….. 7 
P&P Prior and Paramount…………………………………………………………… 15 
RIP Recovery Implementation Program…………………………………………… 6 
RPA Reasonable and Prudent Alternative………………………………………….. 8 
SES Social-ecological System……………………………………………………... 20 
SJCP San Juan-Chama Project……………………………………………………… 12 
 
 
 
